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Executive Summary 
China’s rapid increase of outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) over the past decade 
has garnered worldwide attention for a variety of reasons. Of particular concern is the 
concentration of Chinese OFDI in extractive industries, especially in developing countries. 
Generally, developing countries have fewer and weaker regulations than developed nations, 
exposing them to more severe environmental degradation. As the environmental consequences of 
such growth and investment become more visible, governments, companies, and communities 
pursue better environmental management and protection policies. 
Increasing environmental awareness and protection measures are evident in China’s 11th 
and 12th five-year plans, which suggests that domestically China is pursuing a more efficient and 
sustainable growth than in previous decades. China plans to implement policies to increase 
accountability and capacity to improve environmental protection. While challenges still exist, 
namely China’s growing demands for energy, such policies will provide a framework to advance 
environmental protection.  
China’s growing demand for and consumption of energy drives Chinese OFDI. The 
concentration of China’s investment in extractive industries leads to substantial environmental 
degradation. The majority of investment takes place through large state-owned enterprises. 
Despite improving its domestic environmental policies, China lacks any environmental 
regulation of OFDI. Though it promotes corporate social responsibility (CSR) and recently 
released legal guidelines for OFDI, such practices rely on the initiative of the investing company. 
The domestic policy environment interacts with the regulations of the recipient countries, 
resulting in differing environmental impacts. 
3 
 
An examination of several countries from varying regions illustrates how investments 
interact with recipient countries’ regulations. The increase of Chinese investment has affected 
the environment of South America, Mongolia, Myanmar and Zambia. Chinese investment in 
South America has allowed China to secure natural resources by increasing petroleum and 
mining production. Investment has impacted both small and established producers throughout the 
continent. South America, in particular Peru, shows how political development and improved 
financial markets can improve the regulatory environment, allowing FDI to benefit recipient 
countries.  
Most Chinese FDI entering Mongolia is in the mining sector to meet China’s growing 
demand for minerals. Investors in this sector include large Chinese state-owned mining 
enterprises that dominate Mongolia’s largest deposits, as well as small and medium Chinese 
mining firms in the artisanal mining industry. Unlike their larger counterparts, these small and 
medium mining firms do not employ environmentally friendly technology to extract minerals. 
Hence, Chinese artisanal mining has harmed Mongolia’s environment by generating excess 
surface water, waste rock piles, tailings, and mercury pollution, which causes air and water 
pollution. Inadequate law enforcement and local government corruption, coupled with the 
increasing influence of China, have made it difficult for Mongolia’s central government to 
address these environmental issues.  
In Myanmar, FDI in the nation’s hydropower, oil and gas and mining sectors has resulted 
in water pollution, destruction of fisheries, loss of biodiversity and deforestation. Chinese 
investors and firms from other countries, whose investments predate those of China, caused these 
environmental issues. They can also be attributed to Naypyitaw’s ineffective environmental 
governance, resulting from underdeveloped institutions and flouting the of its own environmental 
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laws. To improve environmental governance, Myanmar’s government must develop its 
institutions, devote more resources to environmental protection and promote environmental 
education.            
In Zambia, Chinese investments are concentrated heavily in the country’s copper mining 
industry.  In Zambia, the country’s reliance on the mining sector results in air and water pollution 
of the surrounding areas. Though Chinese companies are by no means the largest investors or 
polluters in Zambia’s mining sector, the rapid increase of investments has made China 
particularly influential. The legislative and regulatory framework exists for environmental 
protection in Zambia, but the country lacks capacity for enforcement and accountability 
mechanisms. As such, several international mining companies have no incentive to comply with 
environmental regulations, worsening environmental degradation. 
 To generate recommendations for improved environmental performance through 
sustainable outward foreign direct investment, we analyzed several viewpoints.  Using the 
country report, we identified existing regulations and discovered areas where regulations or 
environmental awareness is lacking.  One major observation from the country report is that 
China does not impose environmental regulations on outward foreign direct investment; instead, 
the government expects firms to comply with the regulations of the host countries.  This raises an 
interesting question about whether home countries have an incentive to regulate environmentally 
sensitive areas.  We surveyed theory and the existing literature on the pollution haven hypothesis 
to see if host countries avoid environmental regulations to encourage investment.  Although the 
theory remains popular, robust evidence of the hypothesis does not exist.   
 After completing the theoretical approach, we chose to apply country case studies to see 
if any developed countries have taken the lead in imposing environmental regulations.  After 
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studying the U.S., Canada, and Europe, we found that environmental regulations for in-country 
development are common.  However, like China, these countries do not actively regulate OFDI.  
In the absence of a global regulatory environment, a collaborative effort is needed. 
 Through the research, we discovered a multi-tiered relationship, in which the home 
government, the host government, NGOs, and investors can all coordinate to improve 
environmental outcomes.   After noting that the two-way tie between governments and investors 
is not always sufficient for regulations, we looked into alternative third parties that can affect 
environmental awareness.   Through a literature review, we identified NGOs as powerful actors 
that can affect information availability, policy, operations, assessment and monitoring, and 
environmental advocacy. 
 The combination of country analysis, theoretical framework building, case studies, and 
player identification allows us to formulate recommendations from the macro to the micro level.  
Specifically, we identified several broad categories where improvements can occur:  with local 
communities and NGOs, with regulatory bodies, and with investors.  Some recommendations 
apply to China’s environmental regulations; some apply to our four country regions; and others 
apply to investors and NGOs.  
TNC can help local communities and NGOs develop institutions, increase awareness, and 
build capacity to enhance management of environmental resources. By partnering with 
regulatory bodies, TNC can work to improve monitoring of environmental regulations through 
additional training and providing access to accurate information. Where investors are concerned, 
TNC and government actors can help improve banking practices and provide incentives to 
encourage environmental protection. 
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Country Report Introduction  
China’s economic achievement during the past three decades has been extraordinary.  
However, the focus of environmental sustainability was not incorporated into the country’s 
earlier development plans, and the rapid economic growth has entailed a tremendous 
environmental cost.  Increasingly the pollution and resource depletion that accompanied China’s 
growth has raised greater awareness about the value of conservation, as a long term strategic 
interest and even a competitive advantage.1  At the same time, with the implementation of the 
Going Global Strategy, China’s foreign direct investment (FDI) to the rest of the world has 
skyrocketed.2  The substantial growth in its outbound FDI has brought China’s treatment of the 
environment to the forefront of international attention.   
China’s recent environmental focus—at the domestic and the international level—
correlates with growing international advocacy for environmentally-friendly development.  
Within China, a number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are working to improve 
China’s regulatory and investment policies for the environment.  The Nature Conservancy 
(TNC) is one of the world’s largest conservation organizations.  TNC has been working in China 
since 1998.  This study was undertaken by the George Bush School of Government and Public 
Service on behalf of TNC’s China Program to analyze the environmental impacts of China’s 
outward FDI.  The ultimate objective is to formulate policy recommendations for China and 
related countries to improve environmental protections in FDI induced activities and to provide 
context and suggestions for how TNC can work with “China, Inc.” in pursuit of conservation 
objectives and more sustainable development globally..   
To understand China’s environmental approach, we will start with the analysis of China’s  
domestic environmental policies, with a focus on the environmental component of its 11th and 
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12th Five-Year Plans.  Then we will examine environmental policies and China’s FDI in four key 
regions (Latin America, Mongolia, Myanmar, and Zambia).  TNC Beijing has identified these 
regions as areas in which investment requires an environmentally sensitive approach.  In 
particular, we will analyze the interplays between Chinese FDI regulations, Chinese businesses 
investing abroad, and the host-countries.  Ultimately, we will identify critical areas where 
policies and regulations of China and the host countries can be improved for environmental 
protections.  
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PART 1:  CHINA OVERVIEW 
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Overview of China’s 11th 5-Year Plan 
 China’s 11th Five-Year Plan, which lasted from 2006-2010, incorporated a number of 
objectives, including economic growth, improved employment, development of the services 
sector, and energy reduction. 3   Specifically, the plan incorporated six objectives:  “expand 
domestic demand, optimize industrial structure, save resources and protect environment, enhance 
the capability of independent innovation, deepen reform and opening up, and be people-
centered.”4  According to the World Wildlife Federation, the central cornerstones of the Plan 
were “resource efficiency, global responsibility, and reduced environmental destructions.5  Prior 
to the plan, China experienced a period of rapid and substantial growth.  However, with rapid 
growth came substantial change.  As a result, policy makers decided to focus on “growing 
economic and social imbalances,” which included “a mixed record in the improvement of 
environmental quality.”6 
 
Environmental Objectives 
 China’s 11th Five-Year Plan included a series of environmentally-focused objectives.  
The environmental objectives are influenced by a number of goals.  As the State Council of the 
People’s Republic of China observed, “with long-term unremitting efforts, we will improve eco 
environment, dramatically raise resource efficiency, strengthen our capacity in sustainable 
development and develop an environment-friendly society where man live in harmony with 
nature.”7  In the 11th Five-Year Plan China’s investments to improve the environment are higher 
than in any previous plan.  Specifically, environmental protection spending was more than two 
times the amount spent in the 9th Five-Year Plan, “exceeding 1% GDP for the first time.”8  To 
encourage efficient use of resources and promote a cleaner environment, the plan incorporated a 
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number of priorities:  promoting recycling, improving policy, implementing regulations, 
protecting ecology, and strengthening the protection of the environment and resource 
management.9   
 A primary driver behind the focus on the environment was a desire from the government 
to shift economic growth away from rapid resource consumption and pollution to efficient 
development and sustainable resource use.10  To counter the negative effects of rapid growth 
from previous plans, the government decided to incorporate a number of conservation goals.  
The goals that were specific to the five-year plan, as stated by the Minister of the National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), were as follows:  “implement...resources 
conservation and environment protection…protect and restore ecosystem and environment, 
strengthen environmental protection, improve resources management, [and] promote…a 
resources-conserving and environment-friendly society.”11   
 The greatest area of emphasis for environmental objectives was the energy sector.  China 
imposed the goal of a 20% reduction in energy consumption per unit; the goal was essentially 
met, and consumption declined by 19.06% by the end of the period.12   In addition to a 630 Mtce 
reduction in energy, the intensity of CO2 emissions was reduced by 1550 MT in the period.13  
Also, the imposition of seven indicators for water conservation and pollution reduction marked 
the first time that a five-year plan made energy efficiency a quantitative goal.14  A number of 
specific targets were related to emission reduction, water monitoring, and pollution control, as 
seen in Table 1 below. 15   Some targets were more generic, such as the improvement of 
institutions, regulations, and the rule of law.  China also advocates international cooperation.  For 
example, as seen in Table 2, the country is privy to a number of international environmental 
agreements with other nations.16  However, China still has plenty areas where its environmental 
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regulations could be improved.  For example, the World Bank noted that China could utilize 
fiscal and tax policy to reach environmental objectives:  for example, “accelerated energy price 
reform would allow prices to reflect the full cost of supply, including environmental and 
depletion costs.”17 In addition, payments for the use of environmental resources could be used to 
boost income in the lower-income regions of China.18  
Table 1 
Major environmental protection indicators during the "11th Five Year Plan" period 
  Indicator 2005 2010 
Increase & reduction 
during the "11the Five-
Year Plan" period 
1 COD (10000 t) 1414 1270 -10% 
2 SO2 (10000 t) 2549 2295 -10% 
3 
Percentage of the water sections under 
national monitoring program failing to meet 
Grade V National Surface Water Quality 
Standard (%) 
26.1 ＜22 -4.1 percentage points 
4 
Percentage of the water sections (of 7 big 
waters of China) under national monitoring 
program meeting Grade III National 
Surface Water Quality Standard (%) 
41 ＞43 2 percentage points 
5 
Number of days in which urban air quality 
of key cities is superior to Grade II National 
Air Quality Standard exceeding 292 days 
(%) 
69.4 75 5.6 percentage points 
Source:  State Council, The National Eleventh Five-year Plan for Environmental Protection (2006-2010), 5. 
 
Table 2 
 
Box 8 International Environmental Conventions with China as a Party 
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Name of Convention Ratifying time Department in charge 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species 
of Wild Fauna and Flora  April 8, 1981  
State Forestry 
Administration (SFA) 
Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by 
Dumping Wastes and Other Matter  
September 6, 
1985  
State 
Oceanic  Administration  
The Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone 
Layer  
September  11, 
1989  SEPA 
London Amendment for Montreal Protocol on Substances 
that Deplete the Ozone Layer June 14, 1991  SEPA 
Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary 
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal  
September 4, 
1991  SEPA 
Ramsar Convention   July 31, 1992  SFA 
Convention on Biological Diversity  
November 7, 
1992  SEPA 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change  
November 7, 
1992   NDRC 
Convention on Nuclear Safety  April 9, 1996  SEPA 
Convention on the Prevention and Control of 
Desertification  
December 30, 
1996  SFA 
Amendment of the Basel Convention on the Control of 
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and 
Their Disposal 
May 1, 2001  SEPA 
Kyoto Protocol  August 1, 2002  NDRC 
Copenhagen Amendment for Montreal Protocol on 
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer April 22, 2003  SEPA 
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Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants  June 25, 2004  SEPA 
Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent 
Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals in 
International Trade  
December 29, 
2004  SEPA 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety  April 17, 2005  SEPA 
1996 Amendment of the Convention on the Prevention of 
Marine Pollution by Dumping Wastes and Other Matter June 29, 2006  
State 
Oceanic  Administration 
Source:  State Council, The National Eleventh Five-year Plan for Environmental Protection (2006-2010), 27. 
 
 The Economist Intelligence Unit provided a report card for China’s 11th Five-Year Plan:  
China performed well in GDP and job growth; it promoted inclusive growth relatively well; it 
received average ratings in economic rebalancing; it achieved energy reduction targets; but it 
performed poorly in pollution reduction. 19  For example, although energy consumption and 
emissions intensity declined, total emissions actually increased 33.6%; this made China the 
largest greenhouse gas emitter by the end of the Five-year Plan.20  The State Council of the 
People’s Republic of China recognized a number of environmental areas that the plan failed to 
address:  “There are also such problems as environmental protection lagging behind economic 
growth, poor or inflexible mechanism, insufficient input and capacity. The phenomena of no 
strict observation of laws, little punishment to lawbreakers, poor law enforcement and 
supervision are still very common.”21  Some strategies could be utilized to improve areas of poor 
performance.  For example, the World Bank argues that market incentives and regulations could 
be used, “including the criteria used for performance evaluation of local government officials.”22  
In other words, the conclusion from the progress during the 11th-Five Year Plan was that 
regulations could play a greater role in reaching environmental objectives. 
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 In order to achieve environmental goals, the government has the option of utilizing both 
administrative and market measures.  To promote environmental policy, China could implement 
policies such as environmental taxes, a mechanism for ecological compensation, and green trade 
policies, procurement, insurance, securities, and credit.23  In 2007, the Ministry of Environmental 
Protection (MEP), the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC), and the People’s bank 
of China (PBOC) implemented a Green Credit Policy, which uses inter-agency collaboration to 
promote lending only for green business initiatives.24 
 
In Transition 
 The 12th Five-Year Plan shares a number of objectives with the previous plan.  Both 
plans focus on improving the lives of the Chinese people through increased wages, increased 
education availability, and healthcare; also, both plans have goals for industry, but “they have 
fewer numerical production targets than earlier five-year plans and rely more heavily on market 
mechanisms to achieve these industrial goals.25  One important change in the 11th Plan that 
carried over to the 12th Plan was to identify targets as either restricted or expected:  local 
government officials must meet restricted targets as a job requirement; in contrast, market forces, 
supported by government, must carry out expected targets.26 In the 11th Five-Year Plan, eight out 
of twenty-two targets were restricted, and they included “energy efficiency, pollution control, 
and population reduction.”27  The remaining targets were expected targets. 
 The 12th Five-Year Plan has some differences with the previous plan as well.  For 
example, a number of priority areas have been identified:  economic rebalancing, inclusive 
growth, and environmental policy change.28  Once the 12th Five-Year Plan was announced, a 
number of quantitative differences emerged.  For example, under the 12th Five-Year Plan, 
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“compulsory indicators go up from two to four, ammonia nitrogen and NOx (mono-nitrogen 
oxides) are included in addition to COD (chemical oxygen demand) and SO2 (sulfur dioxide), 
the total ammonia nitrogen and NOx emissions will decrease by 10% respectively compared 
with that of 2010, the reduction of COD discharge and SO2 emission will go down by 8%.”29  In 
addition, environmental quality will also receive a greater focus.  For example, indicators, 
monitoring, and assessment will receive greater emphasis, and the number of cities subject to 
evaluation will almost triple.30  The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 
compared the resource and environmental targets between the 11th and 12th Five-Year Plans; as 
seen in Table 3, it identified actual achievements in the targets in 2010.31  For example, the 11th 
Five-Year Plan imposed an energy intensity reduction goal of 20%, and it achieved a 19.1% 
reduction; however, the 12th Five-Year Plan created a goal of only 16% by 2015.32 
Table 3 
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Source:  Casey and Koleski, “Backgrounder:  China’s 12th Five-Year Plan,” 16. 
 One concern that arose in the 11th Five-Year Plan that carried through to the 12th Five-
Year plan is the ability to enforce environmental protection.  For example, a major obstacle to 
improvement is that management is lacking.  As of 2011, it was noted that “the contents of 
current environmental laws and regulations for environment…remain too general.  There is no 
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legal system or set of standards that can meet the actual needs for environment and health work,” 
and baseline studies are almost nonexistent.33  Another critical issue is that institutional support 
for the environment only exists at a small scale on the national level, and few organizations exist 
at the local level.34  The lack of environmental institutional development makes monitoring and 
accountability enforcement more difficult.   
 
The 12th Five-Year Plan 
 In 2010, the elements of the 12th Five-Year Plan, which covers years 2011 to 2015, were 
announced.  The plan incorporates a number of key targets:  economic targets, which include 
growth and employment objectives; economic restructuring, which includes consumption, 
industry, service, and urbanization objectives; innovation in research, development, and patent 
creation; environment and energy improvements, which include fuel and water conservation, 
emission reductions, and forest coverage increases; agriculture objectives related to production 
and coverage; livelihood improvement in the areas of population, life span, pensions, 
construction, and minimum wage; social management, which includes better public, legal, and 
social management services; and reform related to markets, business, and governance.35   
 Along with the targets of the plan, a number of goals were also incorporated.  The goals 
are summarized as economic rebalancing, improving social inequality, and improving the 
environment.36  To promote its goals, the 12th Five-Year Plan has narrowed its focus to seven 
priority industries, including new energy, energy conservation and environmental protection, 
biotechnology, new materials, new information technology, high-end equipment manufacturing, 
and clean energy vehicles.37 
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Environmental Objectives 
 The environment takes even greater precedence in the 12th Five-Year Plan than it did in 
the 11th Five-Year Plan. In fact, a number of analysts have dubbed the 12th Five-Year Plan (FYP) 
as “China’s ‘greenest’ FYP ever.”38  Among the seven priority industries in the Five-Year Plan, 
“three sectors align with the theme of sustainable growth: energy savings and environmental 
protection; new energy; and clean energy vehicles.”39  Two priority areas are in energy and in 
improving the quality of the environment.  Unlike the 11th Five-Year Plan, which had an energy 
emission reduction target of 20%, the current plan will only have a reduction target of 17%.40  
However, the focus on environmental quality will be greater.  One innovation expected to stem 
from the current plan is the creation of a green indicator “that will hold government officials 
accountable for green development, such as water consumption per unit of GDP, and proportion 
of GDP that is invested in environmental protection.”41  Some of the major objectives in 2012 
are as follows:  pollution reduction; safe drinking water maintenance; waste and hazardous 
chemicals pollution control; improvement of infrastructure; “reverse of the degradation trend of 
eco environment; evident enhancement of capacity in supervision on nuclear and radiation 
safety; further improvement of nuclear and radiation safety and environment supervision 
system.”42 
 The Ministry of Environmental Protection identified five critical tasks to improve the 
environment during the 12th Five-Year Plan:  implement a survey for environmental issues; 
perform risk management; complete environmental scientific research; promote capacity 
building; and perform environmental publicity and education.43  To ensure the implementation of 
the tasks, a number of measures will be utilized.  Specifically, three safeguarding measures will 
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be used, including strengthening leadership for environmental work, improving coordination, 
and improving capital input for environmental work.44 
 A major challenge to the country is sustainably confronting energy consumption.  As the 
country grows, energy demand is expected to soar.  As a result, as shown in Table 4, China is 
changing the composition of energy consumption.45  For example, one goal is for non-fossil fuels 
to account for 15% of China’s energy consumption by the year 2020.46  It is expected that 
investment in environmental protection will exceed three trillion renminbi for the current plan, in 
contrast to the two trillion spent in the 11th Five-Year Plan.47  The spending will require roughly 
1.4% of China’s GDP, and approximately half of the spending will go toward eight projects that 
have been designated as critical to environmental development.48   The eight projects consist of 
declining emissions; welfare and environment improvement, environmental protection focused 
on rural areas,  “protection of eco environment, prevention of environmental risks of key fields, 
ensuring nuclear and radiation safety, public service of environmental infrastructure, and 
ensuring the capacity in environmental supervision and development of talents.”49 
Table 4 
 
Source:  APCO, China’s 12th Five-Year Plan, 6. 
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 To ensure progress, the plan has incorporated seven primary indicators for environmental 
improvement, including four indicators for pollutant reduction and two indicators for 
environmental quality.50  The pollutants to be reduced include “COD, ammonia, nitrogen, SO2, 
and NOx,” and the environmental indicators are related to water and atmospheric quality.51  
Overall, pollution reduction is expected to range between 30 and 40%.52  The primary 
responsibility to carry out environmental assessments lies with local governments.  According to 
the Ministry of Environmental Protection, local governments are required to perform 
assessments in 2013 and 2015; to promote transparency, the results will be “made public and 
serve as [an] important component of the performance of local government.”53  In general, FYPs 
follow a cycle of policy execution for the entire period, and revision occurs in the fourth and fifth 
years.54 
 To improve its environmental objectives, China has initiated cooperation with a number 
of organizations.  A major player in China is the World Wildlife Fund (WWF).  To encourage 
sustainability, the WWF has coordinated with China to create the China for a Global Shift 
Initiative.55  As noted in the goals of the 12th Five-Year Plan, China hopes to develop a green 
indicator.  In 2011, the China Centre for International Economy Exchange (CCIEE) and the 
WWF “signed a Memorandum of Understanding that aims, among other issues, to develop a 
Green Economy Indicator for China.”56  The indicator, which should help shape 
environmentally-friendly policies, will include components such as the Ecological Footprint.57  
By incorporating the expertise of environmental organizations into its policy making, China will 
better position itself to achieve its sustainable development goals.   
 
China Outward Foreign Direct Investment Environmental Policy (OFDI) 
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 OFDI in China has rapidly expanded since the country’s accession to the WTO.  In the 
year 2000, China implemented a trade-promotion and market access strategy called Going 
Global (zouchuqu).58  In addition to resource acquisition, the plan also intends to “spur outward 
investment by subsidizing investment by Chinese companies in overseas natural resources 
acquisition.”59  Since that time, investment has substantially risen.  From the years 2000-2005 
OFDI increased 65.6% annually.60  By 2011, OFDI stock rose to over $300 billion.61  A number 
of factors drive China’s outward expansion, including a desire for greater resource acquisition 
and investment opportunities.  In the context of sustainability, two major challenges exist for 
investment:  the first concern is how to invest in other countries while minimizing environmental 
impacts; the second concern is how to support growth and development in a way that does not 
substantially consume natural resources.62  China is a high-growth developing country.  As a 
result, the country’s environmental standards for investment have come under scrutiny.   
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 Despite being a large country, excess demand exists for resources in the country.63  As a 
result, the primary driver for China’s OFDI is to acquire resources.  From the beginning of the 
11th Five-Year Plan to the present, major commodities included fossil fuels, mineral resources, 
forestry and timber, and food products.64  Major players in OFDI tend to be state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs).  For example, in 2009, just under 70% of OFDI came from SOEs in sectors 
such as oil and mining.65  In 2011, Chinese OFDI was still largely driven by the state; the 
combination of expanding national industries and overseas procurement reflects “a broader 
agenda of economic nationalism focused on energy security, geopolitics, and competitiveness.”66 
As noted in Table 5, in 2010 and 2011, some of China’s major investment deals were in the 
energy and metals sectors.67  Consequently, some of the major production sectors that China 
OFDI is directed toward also produce the greatest environmental damage.  For example, oil and 
gas, mining, hydropower, and timber are sectors that are environmentally sensitive.68  
Table 5 
23 
 
Chinese Outward Investment
 
Source:  Derek Scissors, “China Global Investment Tracker: 2012”. 
 China supports sustainable and environmentally-friendly investment abroad.  However, 
the standards for OFDI are not the same as home standards.  For example, China’s investment 
package “does not have benchmarks of compliance with human rights, democratic ideals and 
environmental protection regulations, but is built on relationships and friendship.”69  In this case, 
cultural differences may explain some of the variation between China’s environmental 
investment policies and the policies of Western nations.   Another cultural variation is that China 
tends to make policy decisions behind closed doors.70  This makes transparency and 
accountability more difficult.   
Year Month Investor
Quantity, 
Millions Partner Sector Subsector Country
2010 February Sichuan Tengzhong $150 Hummer Transport Autos USA
2010 June Zijin Mining $500 Indophil Resoures Metals Australia
2010 June State Grid $1,200 Quadra Metals Copper Chile
2010 July Huawei $480 2Wire TechnologyTelecom USA
2010 August China Railway $790 Transport Rail Angola
2010 August Huawei $1,300 Motorola TechnologyTelecom USA
2010 August CIC $690 Morgan Stanley Finance Banking USA
2010 SeptemberChina Metallurgical $390 Cape Lambert Metals Iron Australia
2010 SeptemberCIC $360 Bumi Resources Metals Indonesia
2010 SeptemberZijin Mining $280 Copperbelt Minerals Metals Congo
2010 October Wuhan Iron and Steel $800 Energy Coal Mozambiqu
2010 October China Railway Construction $620 Transport Rail Saudi Arabi
2010 November Huawei and ZTE $5,000 Sprint TechnologyTelecom USA
2011 February CNPC $5,390 EnCana Energy Gas Canada
2011 March China Gezhouba $840 Real Estate Libya
2011 March China Railway Construction $4,240 Transport Railway Libya
2011 March China Metallurgical $820 Real Estate Libya
2011 March China State Construction Engineering $1,340 Real Estate Libya
2011 March Bright Food Groups ltd. $2,410 Sodiall Agriculture France
2011 May Guangdong Nuclear $1,200 Kalahari Minerals Energy Britain
2011 May Hawtai Motor $170 Spyker-owned Saab Transport Autos Netherlands
2011 June China Overseas Engineering $450 Transport Autos Poland
2011 June Sinosteel $1,990 Metals Iron Australia
2011 July CITIC $2,600 Pilbara Metals Iron Australia
2011 SeptemberChina Power Investment Corporation $3,600 Power Hydro Myanmar
2011 October Anshan $170 Steel Development Metals Steel USA
2011 October Sichuan Hanlong $150 Bannerman Metals Australia
2011 November CNOOC $7,100 Pan American Energy Argentina
2011 November Huang Nubo $200 Real Estate Iceland
2011 December Pang Da and Zhejiang Youngman $140 Saab Transport Autos Sweden
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 One topic that China is advocating abroad is corporate social responsibility (CSR).  
Although not explicitly related to the environment, CSR includes environmental protection 
within its objectives.  The promotion of CSR may have positive implications for responsible 
OFDI, but the benefits may take time to accrue.  For example, many large companies abroad 
utilize environmental protection policies, “‘but they need to quantify and collect data.  CSR is 
still a new concept for Chinese companies.’”71 In a study on responsible business in Africa, most 
businesses defined CSR as a combination of local growth promotion, compliance with laws, 
making donations, and environmental responsibility.72  Therefore, any failure of Chinese foreign 
investors to promote environmentally-friendly growth may not be an educational issue, by may 
instead stem from monitoring and enforcement problems.   
 However, businesses are taking action to promote environmental sustainability.  In 
addition to government support of CSR, businesses are increasingly adopting certain 
international standards such as the “GRI Sustainability Reporting Guidelines, and ISO 
environmental management system standards. In addition, by 2008, nearly 200 Chinese 
companies had joined the UN Global Compact, accepting its ten principles on sustainability.”73  
Also, training courses on CSR and environmental awareness from international institutions and 
NGOs such as the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and the WWF are becoming 
increasingly popular.74  In addition, researchers from the Center for International Forestry 
Research noted that the Chinese government will likely play a stronger role in sustainable OFDI 
in the future:  “we can expect that more policies concerning the social and environmental 
impacts of Chinese OFDI will be issued, supplementing China’s existing OFDI management 
system.”75 
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 In December 2011, the National Development and Reform Commission and the State 
Administration of Commerce updated the Foreign Investment Industrial Guidance Catalogue.76  
The Catalogue, which came into effect in January 2012, promotes reform, upgrading industries, 
developing the service industry, and promoting the development of trade regions.77  One of the 
primary points of the new catalog is to encourage foreign investment related to “strategic 
industries such as energy-saving and environmental protection, new-generation information 
technology, biology, high-end equipment manufacturing, new energy, new materials, and new 
energy vehicles.78  The emphasis on many of these industries reflects the development goals of 
the 12th Five-Year Plan. 
 
Government Role in Environmental Protection 
 On January 11, 2012, a Chinese law firm, in conjunction with Oxfam Hong Kong, 
released China’s legal guidelines on OFDI.79   In general, China has thorough legal guidelines 
for environmental protection in place.  For example, China’s Constitution calls for ecological 
environment and natural resource protection; protection laws are in place for environmental 
aspects such as land use, pollution, nature conservation, and excess or destructive resource use.80  
However, these are general rules that apply domestically within China.  A common complaint in 
the literature pertains to the enforcement of environmental laws, not the lack of rules and 
regulations.  OFDI is one area lacking in regulation. 
  Although Chinese firms abroad are increasingly adopting international environmental 
standards, such actions remain voluntary.  In fact, China has no OFDI environmental legislation 
laws in effect.  Instead, any reference to environmental regulation is worded in principle:  “For 
instance, ‘Guidelines on Foreign Investment and Cooperation in Various Countries (Regions)’ 
26 
 
issued by the Chinese Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) in April 2009 requires that Chinese 
enterprises shall protect the ecological environment of investment recipient countries and comply 
with local laws.”81  In this sense, the primary responsibility for environmental protection lies 
with the recipient-country governments and not with China.  However, as noted in Table 6, 
OFDI laws often incorporate guidelines and suggestions for sustainable development.82  
Table 6 
 
Source:  Oxfam Hong Kong, An Introduction to China’s OFDI Legal System, 42-43. 
 It is important to note that China has adopted certain standards to promote 
environmentally-friendly investments.  For example, the Ministry of Environmental Protection’s 
Green Credit Policy applies to credit provision both domestically and abroad.  The policy 
consists of “a set of related documents containing binding and non-binding provisions linking 
credit to corporate environmental performance.”83  In general, the government recommends that 
“authorities should restrict loans to polluting enterprises, adjust credit management, and prevent 
credit risks created by enterprises and construction projects responding to changes in 
environmental protection requirement changes.”84   
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 China’s Export-Import Bank (Ex-Im Bank) policies illustrate the role of finance in 
environmental protection.  The government’s Export-Import Bank of China is one of the largest 
lenders to companies investing abroad.  All companies wishing to borrow from the bank must 
allow an internal review and comply with local laws—the bank states that any project that is 
dubbed as environmentally harmful will not receive funding.85  Although the bank requires 
companies to comply with the policies of host countries, they do not require companies to follow 
international standards; however, the guidance used for the Exim bank is based both on personal 
experience and international recommendations such as the Equator Principles.86 Therefore, 
international imitation for environmental regulations does occur.  
 Although China participates in many international agreements for environmental 
protection, the participation does not necessarily affect foreign investment policy.  In general, 
“multilateral environmental conventions provide no specific instructions on OFDI, foreign 
assistance or credit practices other than general requirements for environmental protection.”87  
The observation indicates a policy gap that the government could fill to improve its 
environmental improvement goals.     
 Recently, policy makers have taken steps to improve environmental policy coordination.  
For example, one proposal, the “Environmental Policy Package,” incorporates mechanisms to 
improve management and supervision of environmental issues.88  Another innovative suggestion 
is the creation of a cooperative alliance between governments, NGOs, and enterprises:  under this 
system, “the government acts as the guide, enterprises provide support and NGOs design and 
undertake the work.”89  With such a model, the key driver of environmental policy formation 
could lie with NGOs.  
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 To best prepare non-government organizations (NGOs) for policy advocacy, it is 
important to understand the regional similarities and variations with China’s outward investment.  
TNC has identified four critical areas of interest for environmental conservation:  Latin America, 
Mongolia, Myanmar, and Zambia.  These areas are also important regions for China’s 
investments for resource extraction.  By analyzing the available resources in the countries, as 
well as looking at investment trends and regulations, one can determine potential variations in 
China’s environmental policies by region.    
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PART 2:  SOUTH AMERICA 
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Assessing the environmental impact of Chinese investment in South America 
 What is the impact of the Chinese state-backed investment in South America in the 
mining sector? China’s voracious demand for oil, natural gas, iron ore, coal, nickel, aluminum 
are driven by government insecurity in maintaining economic growth and thus political stability.  
Over half of Chinese FDI in natural resources has been concentrated in Latin America in the 
form of equity stakes and loans to mining and petroleum.  
 Threats of bribery, corruption, and environmental violations of Chinese firms are of 
concern to Latin American policy makers. Since Chinese firms are not mandated by the Chinese 
government to a certain standard of environmental or social responsibility, the host country 
regulatory system is responsible for controlling the behavior of foreign companies.  
 The overall concern in Latin America is that the Chinese mandate to secure preferential 
access to supplies of raw materials may exacerbate problems of high prices, climbing demand, 
and environmental degradation. As China continues to secure resources, there remains a 
probability that the Chinese will gain monopoly power over the market, hindering competitive 
forces and proper regulation. In general, the Chinese government has difficulty regulating what 
Chinese firms do overseas and these firms overpower the regulatory bodies of host countries.  
 There are four means through which Chinese capital seeks to secure natural resources 
that differ in measure and should differ in policy response. First, China seeks a large equity stake 
in established producers. Second, China makes equity investments in smaller producers.  Thirdly, 
Chinese companies provide loans and financing with a promise to pay via future resource use.  In 
the fourth manner of investment, the loans and financing come from the Chinese government. 
The investments differ:  either the investments gain claim to existing production, or they spur 
greater production by increasing the number of world supply sources. The first scenario 
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describes a zero-sum game where other consumers are worse off because of diverted supplies. In 
the second scenario, global markets are more competitive because of the diversified and 
increasing supply.90 In a study by the Peterson Institute, they noted that most of the investments 
did not gain equity stake in the resource bases and overall had positive spillovers to the local 
South America economies. However, since the Chinese firms are not investing in the large, well-
established producers, the firms operate on fringe projects where best-practices may not observe 
the social and environmental standards of larger projects.  
A New Trend in Chinese Loans to the Region 
 Since 2005, the Chinese Export-Import Bank and the China Development Bank (CDB) 
have loaned a sum of $75 billion to South American countries.91 Overall, these loans surpassed 
the total of the World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, and US Export-Import Bank 
loans. Chinese loans carry fewer conditions, and have lower environmental standards than loans 
originating in the West.  The table below lists recent loan activity from China to Latin America.  
This report focuses on Chinese investments in Colombia and Peru in particular.  
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Activity 
The tables below list recent investments in Latin America by Chinese firms.  
 
Overview of Colombia 
 Colombia has increasingly built stronger trade relations with China over the past few 
years. From the Chinese perspective, Colombia is a valuable partner for trade in minerals, 
petroleum, and agriculture products, as well as a destination market for Chinese manufactured 
goods.92  
Since 2005, after President Alvaro Uribe’s visit to China, the partnership has expanded 
operations and projects in the petroleum sector. Most of Colombia’s reserves are located on the 
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Bahia de Santa Marta on the Caribbean coast. While both Ecuador and Venezuela have 
discovered large reserves nearby, most of Colombia remains unexplored. The Chinese National 
Petroleum Company (CNPC) invested $460 million in September 2006, representing the largest 
commercial venture in Colombian reserves. This, however, remains one of the few Chinese 
investments in Colombia.  
 Rumors exist in Colombia that the Chinese government is involved in infrastructure 
development to increase the viability of coal export projects. Columbia announced plans for a 
$7.6 billion railroad that would link large open pit coal mines to Colombia’s Pacific west coast, 
bypassing the Panama Canal. Announced in early 2011, the project is still tentative and faces 
many barriers to completion. If completed, the rail would dramatically change global supply 
chains and have significant environmental impacts. 93  
 
Evidence from Peru 
China’s investment of $7.2 billion in Peru is solely in the mining sector, second only to 
Australia’s investment. Peruvian exports to China include gold, lead, silver, tellurium, tin, zinc, 
and copper. The Peruvian case provides insight into the behavior of Chinese firms and other 
OECD projects in regard to environmental standards. Over 80% of the foreign investment in 
Peru comes from OECD countries. By comparing OECD investments to Chinese companies in 
Peru, and examining differences in operations and standards, some recommendations can be 
made to better regulate the environmental consequences of Chinese FDI.  
The Yanacocha gold mine, a large investment by an OECD firm, is operated by US 
Newmont Mining Corporation (51.3%), International Finance Corporation, and Peruvian 
Buenaaventura S.A. (43.6%) in addition to smaller domestic ownership shares. In 2000, there 
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was a mercury spill at this mine that poisoned 900 people and resulted in protests and lawsuits 
against US Newmont Mining Corporation. In attempts to improve its negative image, Newmont 
has started international certification processes for environmental and social standards through 
corporate social responsibility programs.  
The Antamina mine, Peru’s largest copper and zinc mine, is a joint venture by Xstrata 
and BHP Billiton with each holding about one-third ownership. It has a very strong reputation 
for its social and environmental standards. In some cases, the companies have decided on more 
costly and time-consuming alternative projects because of domestic contention and international 
observation. The Antamina mine received an “A” rating under the Global Reporting Initiative for 
its environmental responsibility, transparency, and sustainability. 
 In these two cases, both the ventures have complied with substantial environmental, labor, 
transparency, anti-corruption, and human rights standards. Both ventures participate in other 
initiatives to improve accountability, such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
(EITI), which works to build a global standard for transparency within the resource extraction 
sector. They are both members of the International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM) and 
the UN Global Compact to improve sustainable development and create responsible policies.  
The companies also participate in local initiatives and invest in societies that work on 
transparency, sustainability, and responsible management issues. Both companies have 
maintained their royalty commitments and have fairly and promptly paid their national taxes 
with the help of watchdog groups. In addition, the companies make information available to the 
press and the public through their websites in English and other local languages. This 
information includes annual sustainability reports, environmental programs, and other CSR 
issues. The companies have also been certified under the ISO 14001 environmental standards. 
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Within its corporate structure, both companies have foundations and managers dedicated to 
promoting sustainability projects and accountability. 
 
Chinese Investments 
The Chinese investments of interest are in the state-owned Hierro Peru by Shougang, a 
steel company and the purchase of the Toromocho mine by Chinalco, a Chinese aluminum firm. 
The investments are significant because of the size and year of investment, 1992 and 2008 
respectively. Shougang’s purchase occurred at a time when the Shining Path, a communist 
uprising, controlled of the region. The purchase of Toromocho took place under a democratic 
Peru. The different political regimes altered the impacts of investment.  
Shougang failed to maintain its concession commitments of providing community 
support and raised questions when the purchase price was discovered to be 14 times the 
competitive valuation of the mine. In addition, Shougang violated labor standards by importing 
Chinese workers instead of using local labor, did not use social funds, and had environmental 
issues. Besides substandard wages, Shougang was also found to shirk health standards by not 
examining workers for lung conditions while operating in the mines.  
Further, Shougang caused environmental damage by contaminating water supplies and 
pumping wastewater into a nearby bay. The local government declared an “environmental 
emergency” to protest the company’s activities. The company has updated their website to 
include some environmental information, which previously had little to no sustainability reports 
available.94 Overall, Shougang had poor public relations and low ratings in transparency, health, 
safety, and environmental issues.  
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The second and more recent case of Chinalco differs from the poor behavior of Shougang. 
The company held public hearings and assessed the environmental impact of its projects.  In 
addition, Chinalco hired international firms to establish an environmental information 
management system. Overall, Chinalco has proceeded with more caution and transparency than 
Shougang.    
 
Analysis of the Cases 
A key difference in the cases is a result of the different time periods of the investments. 
As Peru shifted toward democracy and political stability, civic society and NGOs played a 
greater role in the implementation of  greater environmental standards. With decentralization of 
power, regional governments gained more influence in enforcing accountability.  
Furthermore, international norms towards the protection of the environment and the 
evolution of Chinese policy towards South America created more opportunities to protect the 
environment. The Chinese government released a policy paper designed to quell the fears of 
governments in Latin America and promote cohesion. The report stated that the Chinese 
government planned to encourage responsible investment by companies that have a strong 
reputation and would be mutually beneficial to both the host country and China. As these 
relationships solidify, Chinese companies have more stake in building long-term stable relations 
that meet local requirements.  
The source of financing for these firms is also important. As centrally directed policy 
filters down through the channels and regulation becomes stricter, firms accountable to the State-
owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC) and 
the recently revised policies of the Chinese Export and Import Bank are more likely to shift their 
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policies in a positive direction. Both Chinalco and Shougang have recently received new loans to 
continue operations in Peru, the latter from various international banks that will hold the 
borrower to higher international accountability standards. Since the initial investment and early 
environmental failures of Shougang, Chinese firms have progressed up the learning curve and 
committed to adhering to best practices.95 At first, Chinese companies may not have recognized 
the bottom-up form of government found in Peru, but have gradually learned the business and 
political culture. The climate in Peru is now demanding greater CSR and Chinese firms are 
adapting.  
 
Policy Implications 
What actions can the Peruvian government and other actors within Latin America take to 
improve environmentally acceptable behavior and avoid the mishaps or some of the negative 
experiences of countries in Africa? Peru and most countries in Latin America are significantly 
more transparent than their African peers, and this factor seems to carry significant weight in 
determining adherence to environmental standards.96  
Another important consideration is the context in which Chinese investment affects 
global competition in the resource markets. If the investment takes up projects that do not attract 
attention from leading producers, then the investment increases and diversifies overall global 
supply. However, high standards and accountability must still be sought to maintain high levels 
of transparency, environmental protection, and interaction with the local community. In those 
cases in which the firm has positive community relations, the trend shows an inclination towards 
better compliance to international standards. However, in the natural resource extraction market 
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the source of investment is only one of the factors that determine the environmental 
consequences. 
 
Lessons from Peru 
First, these cases show the improvement of financial markets brings about greater 
accountability. Once the source of equity is under scrutiny, the borrowers are subjected to 
pressure to improve standards. If the Chinese Export-Import Bank becomes more transparent and 
carries reputational risk, then they will proactively encourage positive behavior.  
Second, the regulatory environment in the host country is critical to maintaining proper 
environmental standards. As the business and civil society climate changed in Peru, so did the 
behavior of the companies. In countries with lower levels of governance ability, weak 
institutional capacity and the lack of political will are often the limiting factors that prevent 
compliance with international norms and standards. 
Finally,  it is evident that FDI  can provide public goods and create change within the 
governance structure of the country. With greater investments comes the capacity to enforce 
environmental standards and provides watchdog groups greater incentive to expand operations. 
In some cases, the multi-national corporations internalize the market failures and have the 
capacity and leadership to initiate change given the right circumstances.  
 
 
APPENDICE: Recent Chinese Investment categorized by type and market impact 
Appendix I. Chinese FDI in Natural Resources: South America 
Category I: Special relationship with major producer 
Buyers and/or their home governments take an equity stake in a "major" producer to procure an equity 
share of production on terms comparable to other co-owners. 
1. CNOOC and Bridas Corporation, Argentina, 2010     
2. Shanghai Baosteel and Vale, Brazil, 2001     
3. Chalco and Vale, Brazil, 2004         
4. Chalco and Vale, Brazil, 2004         
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5. CNPC's acquisition of the Intercampo and Caracoles oilfields from Petroleos de Venezuela SA, 
Venezuela, 1997 
6. CNPC and Petroleos de Venezuela, Venezuela, 2008 
 
Category II: Special relationship with competitive fringe 
Buyers and/or their home governments take an equity stake in an "independent" producer to procure 
an equity share of production on terms comparable to other co-owners. 
7. Shandong Gold Group and Energia y Minerales Soceidad del Estado, Argentina, 2010        
8. Minmetals and Vale, Brazil, 2004         
9. Minmetals and Cosipar Group, Brazil, 2007     
10. WISCO and EBX, Brazil, 2009     
11. Wuhan Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. And MMX Sudeste Mineracao SA, Brazil, 2010 
12. Sinopec and Petrobras, Brazil, 2004     
13. Sinopec and Repsol YPF SA, Brazil, 2010 
14. Minmetals and Codelco, Chile, 2006     
15. Shunde Rixin and government of Chile, Chile, 2009 
16. CNPC's development of Atacapi and Parahuacu blocks, Ecuador, 2003 
17. Sinopec and ConocoPhilips, Ecuador, 2003 
18. CNPC and Sinopec's acquisition of Encanna, Ecuador, 2006 
19. Bosai Minerals and the government of Guyana, Guyana, 2008 
20. CNPC and PlusPetrol Norte SA, Peru, 2004 
21. CNPC's development of Block 6 and 7 or the Talara oilfields, Peru, 1993 and 1994 
22. Shougang's acquisition of Hierro Peru, Peru, 1992 
23. Zijin Mining and Monterrico Metals, Peru, 2007 
24. Shougang Hierro Peru's expansion of the Marcona mine, Peru, 2007 
25. Chinalco's acquisition of the Toromocho Copper Project, Peru, 2008 
26. Minmetals and Jiangxi Copper's acquisition of Northern Peru Copper, Peru, 2007 
27. Zibo Hongda Mining Industyr Co. Ltd.'s acquisition of Pampa de Pongo iron ore mine, Peru, 2009 
Category III: Loan capital to major producer to be repaid in output 
Buyers and/or their home governments make a loan to a "price maker" producer in return for a 
purchase agreement to service the loan. 
28. China Development Bank and Petrobras, Brazil, 2009 
29. Shanghai Baosteel and Vale, Brazil, 2003 
30. China Development Bank and CNPC with the Venezuelan Social Development Bank and Petroleos de 
Venezuela, Venezuela, 2010 
Category IV: Loan capital to competitive fringe to be repaid in output 
Buyers and/or their home governments make a loan to a “price taker" producer in return for a purchase 
agreement to service the loan. 
31. CITIC's investment to build a pig iron plant, Brazil, 2004     
32. China Development Bank and the government of Ecuador, Ecuador, 2009     
33. CPEB and Petroecuador and the Ecuadorian Ministry of Energy and Mining, Ecuador, 2003 
34. Shandong Gold Group and Corporacion Venezolano de Guyana, Venezuela, 2003 
Sources: FDiMarkets.com; RHGroup 
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PART 3:  MONGOLIA 
 
Introduction 
Mongolia is one of the most environmentally rich countries in the world. It has a variety 
of geographical features that can be divided into six zones: desert, mountain, mountain taiga, 
mountain forest steppe, arid steppe and taiga, as well as 3000 rivers, over 3000 big and small 
lakes, 6,900 springs, 190 glaciers and 250 mineral water springs.97 Unfortunately, this diverse 
rich environment is now facing a severe threat as the country undergoes unprecedented economic 
development.98   
The environmental situation in Mongolia is deteriorating. Although some of the 
deterioration is natural—Mongolia suffers from harsh winter, hot summers, and low rainfall— 
much of the deterioration is a result of human activities.99 In its attempt to transition from a 
centrally planned economy to an open market economy, the Mongolian government has 
exploited its natural resources heavily. With much of its population living below the poverty line, 
the Mongolian government has taken the opportunity to capitalize on its mineral resources in 
order to improve the country’s economic prosperity.100 To that end, the government has set laws 
and regulations to establish an attractive environment to foreign direct investments in all sectors 
and businesses.101 The government’s efforts are engendering a worldwide interest in Mongolia’s 
industrial, mining, trade and service sectors.102 Although, according to the UN Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 2003, global FDI declined in 2001-2003, FDI inflow into 
Mongolia continued to increase.103 
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Source: Nachin, Dashnyam. Trends in International Investment Flows: Foreign Direct Investment in Mongolia. 
Universite du Havre. 
 
However, Mongolia lacks the economic infrastructure to attract investment in 
manufacturing and services sectors. Therefore, the main target of FDI has traditionally been the 
natural resources sector.104 Ergo, according to the Foreign Investment and Foreign Trade Agency 
of Mongolia (FIFT), the mining industry received 61% of FDI in 2008.   
The Environment 
The mining sector is a major contributor to the Mongolian economy, accounting for about 
17% of GDP, 65% of industrial value added, and 58% of export earnings.105 The formal mining 
sector employs over 12,000 people and the informal (artisanal) mining sector involves many 
times this number.106 The mining industry in Mongolia is largely based on copper and gold and it 
provides almost 25% of government revenues.107 In order to develop this sector, the government 
enacted the 1997 Minerals Law, abolished a 10% gold tax, and widely publicized discovery of 
43 
 
the Oyu Tolgoi mine in 2001, the world’s largest undeveloped copper-gold mine project. These 
policies contributed to the rapid rise in mineral exploration in early 2000s.108 
 
Source: FIFTA of Mongolia 
However, this sector is considered “the main source of environmentally harmful 
economic activity in the country.”109 According to a World Bank Report “Mongolia A Review of 
Environmental and Social Impacts in the Mining Sector,” the mining sector in Mongolia is 
responsible for the following environmental problems:  
- Changes in Hydrological Regime: Changes in hydrological regimes remain a significant 
problem, particularly for placer gold. On balance, current mining practices are inefficient and 
use excessive process water, overtaxing surface waters and underground supplies, and 
generating excessive effluent, which is difficult to manage and poses a threat of uncontrolled 
discharges of slurry. The water pumped from mines of all types and discharged into open 
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surface water bodies may also cause flooding, leading to the formation of new, transient 
wetlands, which generally fall dry once the mine ceases to operate.  
- Deterioration of Water Quality: Increasing artisanal and small-scale gold mining ASM 
activities are impacting water quality in several rivers across the country. An increased risk 
exists of water-related infectious diseases due to unsanitary conditions of thousands of 
artisanal miners living by the rivers and streams, as well as toxic poisoning from gross 
pollution of surface and underground water by the uncontrolled burning of dung and rubber 
tires in order to melt the permafrost. 
- Waste-Rock Piles and Tailing Repositories: Waste-rock piles and tailing repositories 
are a significant concern at large- to medium-scale mining operations. In Mongolia, most 
waste-rock piles from industrial mining are unstable and prone to erosion. Rainfall washes 
gravel and soil down into valleys, where valuable grazing land can become polluted. In some 
cases, waste-rock piles and tailings are reworked by private miners under unsafe conditions 
and risk injury or loss of life. 
- Mercury Pollution: Mercury pollution is a mounting problem. Mercury was banned 
from gold mines in the former Soviet Union in 1982 and today is used illegally in only a few 
placer and hard-rock mines in Mongolia. However, illegal mercury usage is ubiquitous 
amongst artisanal hard-rock gold miners in Mongolia and has begun to spread to artisanal 
placer gold miners. The advantages of using mercury can often be eliminated by proper use 
of low-cost gravitational methods. 
- Air Pollution: Lower air quality from ASM is posing a growing health threat. Dust 
generated by placer ASM—by shoveling, scraping, chiseling, bagging, and spillages in a 
confined space with poor ventilation—causes eye injuries, bronchial complaints, and 
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silicosis. Even more dangerous is the smoke from fires to melt permafrost, particularly black 
smoke from tires, which contains carbon particles, carbon monoxide, polyaromatic 
hydrocarbons, benzene, phenol, and cyanide. 
- Mining Exploration in Protected Areas: Issues related to the possibility of some 
protected areas being declassified for mining purposes remain unresolved. The Ministry of 
Nature and Environment has twice considered the declassification of several protected areas, 
partially on request of Mineral Resources and Petroleum Authority of Mongolia MRPAM of 
the Ministry of Industry and Trade. Yet no regulations or legal procedures currently exist to 
adequately govern the declassification procedure. 
 In regards to the mining in protected areas, in 2003 the situation was further complicated 
when the government proposed to Parliament for them to remove protected status from some 3.1 
million hectares, about 15% of the protected-area system in four protected areas: the Small Gobi, 
Great Gobi Special Protected Area, Mongol Daguur Special Protected Area, and Onon Balj 
National Park. The government argued that illegal mining activities became widespread in these 
areas, and therefore, removing protection to allow formal mineral exploration and mining to take 
place would restore legal control and regulation of these activities.110  
Although this proposal was rejected in January 2004 by the Standing Committees on 
Economic Protection and Environment and Rural Development, it illustrates that enough 
protection is not being provided by the government to these areas. Furthermore, since the 
exploration activities near the protected areas are increasing, the possibility of discovering 
potential mineral deposits in the protected areas increases, which in turn would place more 
pressure on the government to declassify them and attract more illegal mining activities within 
these areas. As a result, greater monitoring and enforcement of concerned laws are needed.   
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Chinese outward FDI in Mongolia  
  China is considered a significant source of FDI in Mongolia. From 1990-2010, China’s 
share of the FDI implemented in Mongolia was 50% and 49% of the companies registered in the 
country, over this same period time are Chinese. 111 Moreover, Mongolia and China have a 
bilateral investment agreement that has been in effect since 1993.112  
 
Source:  2011 Mongolia Investment Climate Statement; Reeves, J. Mongolian State Weakness, Policy, and 
Dependency on the people’s Republic of China 
 
  This large Chinese presence is attributed to the China’s need for natural resources and the 
attractiveness of Mongolia’s abundant natural resources and proximity to China.113 In addition to 
the mining and oil exploration sectors, according to the European Bank of Reconstruction and 
Development, China is investing in textiles/clothing/cashmere, trade services, and construction. 
However, the mining sector is of priority to Chinese investors; 50% of China’s FDI in Mongolia 
goes to this sector.114 State-owned Chinese large mining firms like Shenhua Group Corp. and 
Aluminum Corp. of China (Chinalco) have dominated Mongolia’s largest deposits, while the 
small scale and artisan mining industry has been significantly penetrated by small medium sized 
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Chinese firms115. According to Altantsetseg, an in-resident economist for the World Bank in 
Mongolia, “the number of ‘Mongolian’ small and medium size firms either partly or totally 
Chinese financed most likely make up the majority of active Mongolian mining companies.”116   
It is important to emphasize here that the small scale mining mines are causing most of the 
environmental damages in Mongolia. Large mines are operated by large firms that use developed 
technology to protect the environment, while small and medium sized firms lack such 
technology.117 
  As a result of this economic dependency, China has become the engine of Mongolia’s 
domestic growth, which in turn increased the Chinese leverage over the Mongolian government. 
It has also allowed China to develop an “unconscious power” over Mongolia’s environmental 
sector.118 This unconscious power manifests itself in the Mongolian government’s inability, or 
unwillingness, to resist the Chinese investments in environmentally harmful activities. Jeffery 
Reeves, research fellow with the Griffith Asia Institute, argues that “Chinese unconscious power 
and Mongolian state weakness are mutually reinforcing. As China exerts greater influence 
through its unconscious power over Mongolia’s environmental security, Ulaanbaatar’s ability to 
attenuate the negative effects of this erodes. The weaker Ulaanbaatar becomes, the more 
unconscious power Chinese actors have over Mongolia’s environmental security.” 119  This 
imbalance in the relationship between the two countries has posed a dilemma on the Mongolian 
government: Sacrifice the economic growth for the sake of environment, or sacrifice the 
environment for continuing economic development?    
 
Environmental laws of Mongolia 
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Mongolia does not lack a legal framework to protect its environment. In addition to a 
long list of environmental laws, the government of Mongolia has regulated mineral exploration 
and extraction under the Foreign Investment Law of 1993. This law includes clauses to protect 
the environment from the harm that this sector causes. Foreign investors, according to this law, 
shall implement measures to ensure the protection and restoration of the natural environment. 
Also, no license shall be granted to a project before examining its impact on the nature. On the 
other hand, the Environmental Protection Law of 1993, states that business entities and 
organizations are required to keep the ecological passport of the area in accordance with 
procedures approved by the central State administrative body. In the event of a breach of the 
environmental obligations, these business entities and organizations shall be liable to fines.  
Unfortunately, the environmental problems in Mongolia cannot be simply resolved by 
enacting laws. The Mongolian government needs to be more effective in enforcing these laws. 
The situation is further complicated as the responsibility of enforcing these laws lies on the local 
governments, “who often have financial stakes in regional mining operations, corruption leading 
to environmental degradation commonly occurs.”120 Rather than trying to reduce corruption on 
the regional levels, in 2009, the Mongolian parliament passed the Law on the Prohibition of 
Minerals Exploration in Water Basins and Forested Areas, which empowers local governments 
even more by giving them the right to determine the actual areas that can be mined.  In effect, the 
local officials can extend the 200 meter minimum at thier discretion. The corruption at the local 
levels prompted the Mongolian president in 2010, to suspend the issuance and processing of both 
mining and exploration licenses. The president justified his action by saying that the Mineral 
Resources Authority of Mongolia is corrupt and disorganized.121     
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TNC’s involvement in Mongolia 
  In order to reduce the environmental damages in Mongolia, the Nature Conservancy is 
partnering with national and regional governments, other conservation organizations and local 
people in creating a lasting natural legacy. Mongolia’s government faces a dilemma:  it must find 
a balance between economic development and environmental protection.  TNC realizes that, in 
order to solve the dilemma, the Mongolian government needs to  
“combine science-based methods with a people-focused approach to create regional plans 
that balance the interests of conservation with sustainable economic development, 
social welfare and nomadic traditions. By gathering, assessing and integrating 
environmental, social and economic information, the sustainable development plans will 
have government and popular backing while protecting Mongolia’s unique natural 
treasures.”122  
TNC works with the Mongolian government and people to apply the development by design 
planning that will enable them to conserve ecosystems by minimizing the environmental impact 
of natural resource exploitation, especially in the extractives industries.   
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PART 4: MYANMAR 
 
Source: Myanmar/Burma: Inside Challenges, Outside Interests, 2010.  
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Introduction 
 By ending its support towards the Burmese Communist Party and establishing full 
diplomatic relations with Myanmar’s junta shortly before the end of the Cold War, China has 
developed a close economic relationship with Myanmar. This relationship has enabled 
Myanmar’s government to defy Western sanctions and has subjected China to Western criticism 
for overlooking the military regime’s ignominious human rights record amid its investment and 
trade with its Southeast Asian neighbor. 
 Even though China has augmented its investment in Myanmar’s natural resources and 
hydropower sector, several other countries such as France and Canada invested in these sectors 
prior to the increase in Chinese investment. The resource-seeking foreign direct investment 
(FDI) of these countries along with China harmed Myanmar’s environment because the 
Southeast Asian nation lacks the institutional mechanisms to preserve its environment. 
Myanmar’s undeveloped institutions for environmental governance will play a key role in 
determining policy recommendations to address the environmental impacts of FDI from China. 
This country report on Myanmar will delve into its environmental issues and the sectors that 
contribute to these issues, pinpoint Chinese FDI in those sectors and examine the plumbing 
behind Myanmar’s environmental governance. 
 
Myanmar’s Environmental Issues 
 Myanmar is endowed with a plethora of natural resources that have sustained the 
livelihood of its indigenous population; these natural resources include biodiversity, forests, 
coastal areas, freshwater sources, oil and gas and minerals. While Myanmar is home to 300 
identified mammals and 7,000 plant species, many of which are endangered,123 it has a diverse 
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array of forest ecosystems, including Delta mangroves, low tropical rainforest, teak forests, semi-
deciduous forests and sub-alpine forests.124 Myanmar’s coastal areas are habitats for mangroves 
and aquatic animals that provide food for the local communities.125 Its freshwater rivers host the 
Irrawaddy dolphin and Blyth’s river frog,126 and they are a source of hydropower potential and 
irrigated agriculture for regional and foreign investors.127 As for oil, gas and minerals, Myanmar 
is replete with 500 million and 100 million barrels of onshore and offshore oil reserves, 
respectively,128 0.57 trillion cubic meters of natural gas reserves,129 and metal ore, fossil fuel and 
gemstone deposits. 
 Because Myanmar possesses such a vast array of natural resources, it attracted large 
amounts of investment from foreign investors, whose extraction of the resources has degraded 
the local environment. This environmental degradation has manifested itself in the form of water 
pollution, destruction of fisheries, loss of biodiversity and deforestation. The culprit that polluted 
Myanmar’s waterways and contaminated the local soil is the mining sector, whose extractive 
processes have dumped arsenic, mercury and sulfuric acid into the soil and coal waste into 
creeks.130 While the 2009 construction of China’s crude oil port at Maday Inland in the Bay of 
Bengal has destroyed local fisheries, 131 flooding from hydropower dam construction and 
mercury disposal from extracting gold has killed the local flora and fauna.132 Logging carried out 
by Chinese and Thai loggers and ethnic armed opposition groups along with forest clearing for 
open pit copper mining has contributed to Myanmar’s high deforestation rate, which is among 
the highest in the world.133 
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Figure 1 
              
 
Affecting Sectors Contributing to Myanmar’s Environmental Issues 
 Myanmar’s environmental degradation from resource extraction accelerated once the 
military seized power in 1988, and it continued as the State Peace and Development Council 
(SPDC) opened the country’s economy by legalizing border trade with neighboring countries and 
inward FDI (IFDI).134 Since that opening, annual IFDI rose gradually until 1996, and it stagnated 
until 2004 (Figure 1) due to the Asian financial crisis and the Myanmar government tightening 
its controls over foreign capital.135 * In 2006, the 12 countries that contributed the most FDI to 
Myanmar’s economy included its Southeast Asian neighbors like Thailand, European Union 
nations such as France and the East Asian countries of China, Korea and Japan (Figure 2). 
** Current statistics on FDI into Myanmar tend to be inaccurate. 
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Among the top 11 sectors in Myanmar that received the most FDI in 2006, electricity, which 
includes hydropower,  
Figure 2 
 
Figure 3 
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was ranked number 1, followed by oil and gas at number 2 and mining at number 6 (Figure 3). 
As pointed out in the section on Myanmar’s environmental issues, hydropower, oil and gas and 
mining have been the largest contributors to the country’s environmental damage. 
Figure 4 – Map of Hydropower Dams Completed or Under Construction in Myanmar 
  
Much activity has occurred recently in Myanmar’s hydropower sector, including the 
planning and construction of hydropower dams, human rights violations with those dam projects 
and the signing of agreements with foreign corporations and governments. Right now, about 48 
hydropower projects are undergoing planning, construction or completion along Myanmar’s 
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major rivers like the Irrawaddy and their tributaries (see Figure 4 for map of hydropower dams 
in Myanmar).136 FDI for these projects has come from China, India, Thailand and Bangladesh’s 
governments and contractors while Swiss contractor Colenco Power Engineering has agreed to 
provide engineering consulting services.137 The local ethnic groups that reside near those 
projects will not receive any hydroelectric power since the dams will siphon 90% of the 
electricity to Myanmar’s neighbors.138 Even worse, construction of these dams will subject these 
ethnic groups to gruesome human rights violations by the Myanmar military or tatmadaw, 
including forced relocation and labor, torture, rape and execution.139 
 Like the hydropower sector, Myanmar’s oil and gas industry has seen much activity, but 
this activity has been carried out since the junta opened the country’s economy in 1988. 
Throughout the early 1990s, foreign petroleum firms Total from France, Unocal and Texaco 
from the United States and PTT Exploration and Production from Thailand partnered with 
Myanmar’s state-owned oil firm, the Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE), to develop the 
Yadana and Yetagun gas fields in the Andaman Sea.140 Most of the gas from those fields has 
been exported to Thailand since 1998, and it provides little benefit to Myanmar’s populace.141 
These exports generated ample amounts of foreign reserves for the military regime. These 
reserves jumped two-fold from US$239 million to US$440 million in August 2001 and reached 
US$939 million in June 2006; most of these reserves were allocated to the regime’s 
administrative organizations and state-owned economic enterprises (SEEs).142 What enabled 
Thailand to procure most of the gas was the gas’ passage through the Yadana and Yetagun 
pipelines in Tennaserim Division, which were jointly constructed in the 1990s by a partnership 
between MOGE and French, American, Thai, Malaysian and Japanese oil firms. Because these 
gas pipelines ran through regions controlled by armed Karen and Mon ethnic groups, Myanmar’s 
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government sent in its tatmadaw as security forces, which cleared land for the pipelines through 
land confiscation, forced labor, torture and killings.143 Besides the Yadana and Yetagun gas 
fields, MOGE has initiated exploration of the Shwe and Shwephyu (collectively known as the 
‘A1-Block’) gas fields along with South Korea’s Daewoo International Corporation, the Korean 
Gas Corporation, the Gas Authority of India Limited (GAIL) and India’s Oil and Natural Gas 
Corporation (ONGC) Videsh.144 Despite having several foreign partners for the joint exploration 
of the A1-Block field, MOGE is entitled to 50% of the extracted gas in this joint venture.145 
 Unlike the hydropower and petroleum sector, less is known on Myanmar’s mining sector, 
especially on its IFDI trends since Myanmar’s economy opened up in 1988. However, the water 
pollution and soil contamination from this sector’s extractive activities is well-documented. Even 
though Chinese FDI has poured into the mining sector since 2005, the sector has received FDI 
from other countries including Russia, Italy and Canada. In 2010, Russia’s Tyazhprom Export 
Company and Italy’s Danieli Company have invested in an iron mine excavated at Shan State’s 
Pinpet Mountain, which is rich in the iron ores of hematite and limonite. Like the Yadana and 
Yetagun gas pipeline construction, the tatmadaw made this excavation, along with the 
construction of an iron factory, possible by forcibly evicting ethnic Pa’Oh and Shan villagers that 
resided at the mountain.146 In addition to the Pinpet Mountain iron mine, the Monywa Copper 
Project in central Myanmar’s Sagaing Division, which is the country’s largest mine, began 
operations in 1999; it is jointly run by Canada’s Ivanhoe Mines and Myanmar’s state-owned 
Number One Mining Enterprise (ME1).147 The mining project’s activities have forced Monywa’s 
locals to switch from farming to artisanal mining because high levels of sulfuric acid from 
copper mining have contaminated the soil and water.148 The sulfuric acid derives from tailings, 
which is toxic waste created from treating applying an organic solvent and electricity to a 
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copper-rich solution to produce 45-kilogram sheets of 99.999% pure copper. The copper-rich 
solution came about by treating copper ore with a leaching solution containing sulfuric acid.149 
Justification for Ivanhoe Mines and ME1 to apply this polluting method of copper extraction 
(called the solvent extraction-electro winning (SX-EW) method) is legal protection from 
Myanmar’s 1994 Mining Law. This law grants immunity from liability, prosecution and fines to 
mining companies that operate in Myanmar.150 
 
Chinese Foreign Direct Investment in Myanmar 
 Even though the West has criticized China for investing in Myanmar’s economy amid the 
junta’s egregious human rights violations, the East Asian country is considered a latecomer as a 
source of FDI for its Southeast Asian neighbor. While the trends of Chinese FDI entering 
Myanmar prior to 2005 are unknown, what is known is that this FDI has eclipsed that of 
Myanmar’s traditional largest investors of Singapore and Thailand.151 Chinese FDI stood at 
US$194.221 million for 26 projects in 2005.152 The official estimate of Chinese FDI in 2005 is 
likely to fall below the actual volume since many hidden Chinese investments and business 
ventures are registered under the names of relatives who are Myanmar citizens or with local 
SEEs.153 The reason why many Chinese and even other foreign investors register as Myanmar 
SEEs is that partnering with those SEEs provides those investors numerous advantages such as 
access to resource-rich areas and goodwill from the government (see Figure 5 for the number of 
SEEs relative to private enterprises in 2002).154 Like its FDI forerunners, China invested 
overwhelmingly in energy and mining and little in manufacturing.155 
 Energy security and rising natural resource demand from China’s rapidly expanding 
economy has prompted the country into diverting much of its FDI toward Myanmar’s 
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hydropower, oil and gas and mining sectors. In 2010, Myanmar received US$8.2 billion of 
Chinese FDI in the resource sector, with US$5 billion going into hydropower, US$2.15 billion 
earmarked for oil and gas and about US$1 billion committed to mining.156  
Figure 5 
 
In the hydropower sector, Chinese FDI has resulted in the completion of six hydropower 
dams in Myanmar from 1996 to 2005, with more in the planning and construction stage. Among 
those six dams completed between 1996 and 2005, the most notable is the Paunglaung 
Hydropower Project: constructed by the Yunnan Machinery Import and Export Corporation in 
March 2005, it cost US$160 million, it generates 280 megawatts (MW) of electricity and it was 
China’s largest hydropower plant in Southeast Asia.157 Since 2006, Chinese state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) have invested into 11 major ongoing hydropower projects, including Hutgyi 
Dam, Yeywa Dam and Myitsone Dam. While Sinohydro was awarded the contract to build the 
600-MW Hutgyi Dam and the 790-MW and US$700-million Yeywa Dam,158 China Power 
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Investment Corporation and Myanmar’s Asia World Company have partnered together to 
construct the 6,000-MW and US$3.6-billion Myitsone Dam.159 In September 2011, Myanmar 
President Thein Sein abruptly suspended the Myitsone Dam’s construction, citing concerns about 
the environment and the locals’ welfare.160 Among the dams completed so far, most of the 
electricity they produce is sold and siphoned off to China, which explains why the country 
diverted most of its resource-seeking FDI to the hydropower sector. 
 Within Myanmar’s oil and gas sector, Chinese FDI has gone into field exploration and 
construction of a petroleum pipeline linking Myanmar’s coastal Arakan State with Kunming, 
Yunnan Province, China. While China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and its 
subsidiary Chinnery Assets were awarded contracts to upgrade four old onshore oilfields in 
central Myanmar,161 PetroChina signed an agreement with MOGE to purchase 6.5 trillion cubic 
feet of gas from MOGE’s portion of the A1-Block field for 30 years starting in 2009.162 As for 
the 2,380-kilometer oil and gas pipeline connecting Arakan State to Kunming, its construction by 
CNPC has been ongoing since 2009, with the pipeline scheduled to operate in 2013. The US$1.5 
billion pipeline will transport Middle Eastern and African oil from Arakan State’s Maday Island 
to China at a rate of 12 billion cubic meters of oil per year, enabling Chinese oil tankers to 
bypass the Strait of Malacca.163 Even though CNPC commissioned and executed a quantitative 
social impact assessment (SIA) for parts of the pipeline route, the Myanmar authorities 
compromised the SIA’s methodology and objectivity by restricting the surveyors to places where 
land confiscation had already taken place and closely monitoring the surveyors as they 
interviewed local villagers.164 
 Myanmar’s mining sector not only has received the smallest portion of Chinese resource-
seeking FDI but also has the least information on Chinese investments in that sector. What is 
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known so far is that China invested in Myanmar’s nickel and copper mines. Recently, China’s 
Taiyuan Iron and Steel Group teamed up with the China Nonferrous Metal Mining Group to 
develop a large nickel mine for US$800 million in Tagaungtaung, Mandalay Division.165 From 
2004 to 2005, Myanmar’s government approved China Non-Ferrous Metal Mining and 
Construction Group and Kingbao Mining Limited’s contracts to survey for nickel and invest 
US$500 million in nickel mining operations near the Myanmar-China border and the 
Ayeyarwady River. Meanwhile, China Hainan Jiayi Machine Import and Export Company 
Limited has surveyed Kachin State and Sagaing Division for copper and other minerals.166 
 
Environmental Governance in Myanmar 
 Myanmar’s environmental governance has been severely underdeveloped and ineffective 
since the junta opened up the economy in 1988. Though Myanmar’s government has drafted 
policies to address its environmental issues and signed international commitments concerning the 
environment, its ability to enforce those policies and meet those commitments are hampered by 
its lack of institutional mechanisms and failure to uphold its own laws. The regulatory bodies and 
environmental policies that have been rendered ineffective by the regime’s hollow institutions 
and flaunting of its own laws include the National Commission on Environmental Affairs 
(NCEA), Forest Department, National Environmental Policy (NEP) and 1992 Forest Law. 
 Due to global awareness and initiatives taken by the United Nations, the SPDC founded 
the NCEA in 1990. The commission’s roles include “educating the public about environmental 
awareness” and “putting together a ‘comprehensive national environmental strategy’ in keeping 
with a ‘modern and developed nation.’”167 This environmental strategy manifested itself as the 
1994 NEP, whose objectives include “establishing sound environmental policies in order to 
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conserve the environment and prevent its degradation” and “integrating environmental 
considerations into the development process to enhance its [Myanmar’s] citizens’ quality of 
life.”168 Despite the NCEA’s founding and its drafting of the NEP, both the regulatory body and 
the policy’s efficacy have been stymied because the SPDC did not grant the NCEA formal 
independence to draft and implement policies.169 Also, the SPDC imposed serious budget and 
staff constraints upon the NCEA, with the 2004–2005 budget limited to US$12,000 and going 
mostly to staff pay.170 Evidence of the NCEA’s limited effectiveness can be seen in its 
composition of the Myanmar National Environmental Performance Assessment (MNEPA), 
which failed to mention the environmental fallout associated with mine tailings disposal, dam 
and pipeline construction and gas field development.171 
 Like the NCEA and NEP, the 1992 Forest Law and Forest Department’s efficacy is 
severely constrained, which is attributed to hollow institutions. The 1992 Forest Law, ratified by 
the junta for national forest conservation, stresses “‘conservation and protection’ to meet the 
needs of the public and the ‘perpetual enjoyment of benefits’ from the forest.”172 Despite the 
high level of technical competence and dedication of Forest Department personnel, their efforts 
to enforce the 1992 Forest Law have been obstructed by the junta’s top-level officials and their 
cronies taking bribes from logging companies that flout the law.173 
 Myanmar has also drafted mining laws that are supposed to address environmental 
concerns associated with the mining sector. However, unlike the NEP and 1992 Forest Law, the 
1994 Mining Law does not even consider those concerns and instead blatantly reflects the 
Myanmar Ministry of Mines’ sole purpose, which is “to boost up present production, to fulfill 
the growing domestic demand and to increase foreign exchange earnings.”174 This law not only 
lacks clarity and logic but also sanctions the seizure of lands above mineral deposits without 
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compensation or resettlement and lacks specific measures requiring an environmental impact 
assessment (EIA) or SIA by the mining permit holder or independent third party.175 As 
mentioned in the section discussing foreign investment in Myanmar’s mining sector, the 1994 
Mining Law grants mining companies with legal immunity from liability, prosecution or fines.176  
Figure 6 – International and Regional Treaties Concerning the Environment to Which 
Myanmar is a Party 
 
Source: Burma Environmental Working Group, 2011. 
 
64 
 
 
Figure 7 – International and Regional Treaties Concerning the Environment to Which 
Myanmar is a Party – Continued from Figure 6 
 
Source: Burma Environmental Working Group, 2011.                                   
These statutes have enabled foreign mining firms like Canada’s Ivanhoe Mines to dispose acidic 
copper mine tailings without bearing the risk of punishment. 
 When it comes to international environmental treaties, Myanmar’s government signs and 
adheres to these treaties in the same half-hearted manner as its NEP. As of 2011, the Southeast 
Asian nation has ratified 31 international environmental treaties, which include the Convention 
on International Trade of Endangered Species (1979), the International Tropical Timber 
Agreement (1996), the Framework Convention on Climate Change (1994) and most notably, the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) (1994)177 (see Figures 6 and 7 for the complete list 
of treaties). The drive for the regime to sign these treaties is that it aware that it must develop its 
environmental governance; it wants to show the world that it is ‘greening’ its policies to shore up 
its legitimacy and international reputation.178 
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 Amid the regime’s constraints on effective environmental governance, it has followed up 
on the CBD by writing and releasing all three mandatory reports on national biodiversity. 
January 2006 saw the United Nations Environment Program Regional Office of Asia-Pacific in 
Bangkok, Thailand pledge its support to the Myanmar NCEA’s development of the National 
Biodiversity Strategy Action Plan (NBSAP).179 CBD signatories are required to assemble this 
plan by incorporating conservation and sustainable use of biological resources into national 
policymaking, especially for the economy.180 However, like the MNEPA, the junta has 
deliberately excluded advice from Myanmar’s indigenous ethnic groups and environmental 
organizations that represent these groups. This exclusion of advice goes against the principles of 
the CBD and NBSAP guidelines.181 
 Despite the regime’s half-hearted approach to environmental governance, three cases of 
limited environmental success by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) exist. Between 1992 
and 2000, the Smithsonian Institution successfully trained staff to preserve the Chatthin Wildlife 
Sanctuary’s ecosystem, which was made possible by the NGO’s good relations with the Forest 
Department.182 Maintaining a good relationship with the Forest Department has enabled the 
Wildlife Conservation Society’s (WCS) to conduct a complete and highly needed scientific 
assessment on 22 out of 31 official protected areas in Myanmar.183 What has also contributed to 
the Smithsonian Institution and WCS’s success is consistent leadership from the local wildlife 
sanctuary superintendent and respecting the junta’s limits on environmental projects – the 
generals want to show that they can run such projects without outside help to shore up their 
claim as protectors of Myanmar’s sovereignty that are independent from foreign influence.184  
Since 1994, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has convinced the regime to 
establish community forests that promote sustainability and micro-income opportunities; so far, 
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764 acres have been designated for community forests with another 1,335 acres under 
consideration.185 Unlike the Smithsonian Institution and WCS, the UNDP has greater political 
acceptance and legitimacy among Myanmar’s government and people; however, the UNDP is 
often subject to criticism by the international community.186 
 Though Myanmar has carried out positive political developments with the recent by-
election in April 2012, the country has a long way to go to address the challenges for its 
environmental governance, including institutional development, resource or budget capacity and 
environmental education. The regime continues to hamper the development of its environmental 
institutions by not granting autonomy and enough power to the NCEA relative to other 
government bodies like the Ministry of Mines. While the regime needs to increase its resource or 
budget capacity for environmental governance, it also must devote greater efforts to educating its 
citizenry and staff at relevant ministries in environmental protection.187 
 
The Nature Conservancy’s Involvement in Myanmar 
 So far, the Nature Conservancy (TNC) has no environmental conservation activities 
going on in the Southeast Asian nation. Nonetheless, the NGO has made a handful of short, 
scoping visits to the country and coordinated with the agencies of WCS, Fauna & Flora 
International (FFI) and the Biodiversity and Nature Conservation Association (BANCA).188 Also, 
TNC’s Jack Hurd has posted two articles analyzing how Myanmar’s gradual political 
liberalization will affect its environment, which are titled “Mission of Burma189” and “More on 
Myanmar: Taking Care of Teak.190”                                      
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Conclusion 
 Since Myanmar’s military government opened the economy in 1988, the country’s 
environment has deteriorated through water pollution, destruction of fisheries, loss of 
biodiversity and deforestation. This environmental degradation is attributed to FDI entering the 
nation’s hydropower, oil and gas and mining sectors. Even though the volume of Chinese FDI to 
those sectors has recently surpassed that of Singapore and Thailand, who were traditionally the 
largest investors, foreign investors from other countries contributed to Myanmar’s environmental 
problems long before China became a major investor. But these foreign investors are not the only 
culprits. Myanmar’s environmental issues are also the product of the regime’s ineffective 
environmental governance from underdeveloped institutions and overt flouting of its own 
environmental laws and commitments. To improve its environmental governance, the 
government must tackle the challenges of institutional development, resource or budget capacity 
and environmental education. Also, a critical strategy to resolving Myanmar’s environmental 
problems involves granting the population the right to voice their opinion over resource-seeking 
investment projects that impact their local environment and livelihood. Now that Myanmar 
President Thein Sein has set the country on the path of political liberalization with the April 2012 
by-election, there is hope that the government will increase its commitment to saving the 
environment. However, much work and many challenges lay ahead for international 
environmental agencies in Myanmar.                
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PART 5:  ZAMBIA 
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Introduction 
Chinese outward foreign direct investment has increased substantially worldwide. The 
country’s investment activities in Africa receive particularly harsh criticism for its concentration 
in extractive industries. Scholars and citizens express concern about Chinese investment because 
of their reputation with poor working conditions, disregard of regulations, and lack of 
environmental preservation policies.191 
 Zambia provides a particularly interesting and representative case of the trends and 
impacts of Chinese investments, because it holds the third largest concentration of Chinese FDI 
in Africa.192 Zambia’s long-standing relationship with China allows a close examination of the 
recent changes. The stable democracy of Zambia and its existing regulatory framework provide 
opportunities for recommendations to mitigate further environmental degradation. The following 
report will detail the environmental problems facing Zambia, identify the particular industries 
involved, and finally examine Zambia’s existing environmental regulations in preparation for 
policy recommendations. 
 
The Environment and Its Problems 
Despite Zambia’s relatively small size, the country is well endowed with natural 
resources, providing its population with their livelihoods and the country with economic growth. 
Zambia’s Sixth National Development Plan (2011-2015) identified land, wildlife, forest, 
minerals, natural heritage and wetlands as the country’s natural resources.193 The diversity of 
resources allows the country to benefit in a variety of ways, contributing an average of 5.5% 
economic growth per year. 194 Uses of the environment include subsistence farming, mining, 
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forestry, and tourism, encompassing the services, manufacturing, and agriculture sectors. 195 
Zambia’s dependence on the environment creates a critical need for conservation policies.   
 
Past and current environmental issues 
Since the population depends heavily on the land, most productive activity results in 
environmental degradation. The country’s energy demand for fuel wood has led to the second 
highest per capita deforestation rate in Africa.196,197 The search for alternative sources of energy 
– such as hydropower – has also caused the degradation of the Kafue Flats, a wetland area in 
Zambia. Hydropower dams have altered the flow of water, overwatering some areas and leading 
to water scarcity in others.198 Zambia hopes to develop the hydropower sector primarily to serve 
as a power source for Zambians, but also to export energy to South Africa.199  
Zambia’s substantial mining sector has generated and continues to generate air and water 
pollution, referred to as legacy pollution.200 The environment has had to bear wastewater and 
sediment discharge leading to pollution and lack of potable water.201 The refining processes have 
resulted in air pollution of the surrounding areas. Land erosion and toxic dumps have caused land 
pollution.202 Mineral production results in large amounts of waste known as slag and tailings, 
which must be destroyed or stored.203 As demand for mineral resources – such as copper – 
increases, Zambia’s economy will continue to grow, further straining the environment.  
 
Affected Sectors: Mining 
Mining has played an integral role in the Zambian economy since the first commercial 
mine opened in 1928. 204  Production and output has fluctuated with the price of copper, 
coinciding with Zambia’s economic cycles.205 The volatility of copper prices also impacts the 
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levels of incoming investments. Multinational corporations, such as the Anglo American 
Corporation, have long dominated the industry.206,207 This trend is common to many extractive 
industries in the developing world, due to the large initial capital investment required. Even 
when the copper industry was nationalized in 1969, two multinational corporations remained as 
minority stakeholders. 208 , 209  In 1980, the nationalized companies were merged into Zambia 
Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM).210 After nationalization, the company started to invest in 
public goods, such as schools, hospitals and roads.211 As the price of copper of declined, the 
government of Zambia and ZCCM could no longer support their various commitments and soon 
looked toward privatization.  
The industry started the process of privatization in the 1990s, under the direction of the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. In 1992, the privatization act created the 
Zambia Privatization Agency (ZPA), which included the Investment Act and the Mines and 
Minerals Act of 1995. 212  The Mines and Minerals Act – in an effort to encourage private 
investment – granted tax concessions to new mine owners, reduced income and royalty taxes, 
provided a stability period of 20 years, and exempted companies from paying customs and excise 
duties for the first five years.213  
These conditions, which largely benefited the private companies, were incorporated into 
the development agreements made between the state and the investors. Development agreements 
also exempted private companies from covering ZCCM’s liabilities, including paying employee 
benefits and assuming responsibility for environmental pollution. 214  Despite the agreeable 
conditions provided by the Zambian government, many companies pulled out of talks to buy 
Zambian mines due to the low price of copper. At this point, China entered the mining sector, 
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acquiring Chambishi mines in 1998 through NFC-Africa, a subsidiary of China Nonferrous 
Metal Corporation (CNMC).215 
In order to maintain the involvement of the Zambian state and absorb the liabilities from 
ZCCM after privatization in 2001, ZCCM-Investment Holdings (ZCCM-IH) was created.216 It 
retains minority stakes in several mines. Investment in the industry has increased as the price of 
copper has risen, largely due to the increase in Chinese demand for copper. Studies have 
concluded that China accounted for 47.6% of the international price change of copper from 
2000-2005, an increase of 23.4%. 217  The copper industry today reports investments from 
Switzerland, Australia, India, China, Canada and the Netherlands.  
The US Geological Survey Service categorizes copper production by ore and concentrate, 
and metal. As of 2009, eight companies produced copper ore and concentrate and another seven 
companies produced copper metal. 218 There was a total annual production capacity of 60.1 
million metric tons in ore and concentrate, and 1.57 million metric tons in copper metal.219 
Currently, Zambia is Africa’s largest copper producer. 220  Copper mining has provided the 
majority of Zambia’s foreign exchange earnings, ranging from 70-80% (Table 1).221,222 Mining 
as a sector has contributed 6-9% of GDP, fluctuating with the price of copper (Table 2).223  
Table 1. Breakdown of Zambia’s Total Exports, 2010 
By commodity group:  
Agricultural products 6.8 
Fuels & mining products 83.2 
Manufactures 8.9 
By main destination:  
Switzerland 51 
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China 20.2 
South Africa 9.1 
Congo, Dem Rep of 4.6 
European Union (27) 4.4 
 
Table 2. Sectoral Contribution to GDP, 1993-2005. 
Sector 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2005 
Mining 9.4 16.7 12.4 11.9 11.8 10.7 6.6 6.4 8.6 
Source: Muneku (2009) 
 
Chinese Involvement 
 As previously mentioned, Chinese involvement has expanded over time. This trend not 
only describes investment, but also migration, tourism, diplomatic visits, aid and trade.224 In 
terms of investment, Zambia holds the 19th largest stock of Chinese FDI in the world and the 
third largest stock in Africa.225,226 The population of Chinese living in Zambia has increased 
from approximately 3,000 during the 1990s to a reported 20,000 in 2010.227 
 Though the growth of Chinese activity in Zambia is relatively recent, China’s 
involvement traces back to Zambian independence. Zambia was the first country in southern 
Africa to establish diplomatic relations with China in 1965.228 In 1970, China granted Zambia a 
large loan to complete the TAZARA railway between Zambia and Tanzania. 229  Generally, 
scholars categorize the relationship into three phases: diplomatic support (1949-1979), a period 
of dramatic change in each country (1979-1999), and a period of political equality and economic 
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partnership (1999-present). 230  Economic partnership clearly captures the recent increase in 
investment, which has generated a heated debate of the impacts in Zambia, explored below.  
 Accurate and reliable figures concerning China’s investment in Zambia are not readily 
available. Figures from the Chinese Ministry of Commerce (Table 3) provide a general picture, 
without providing sector-specific information or the details of the investment terms. Conversely, 
data provided by Zambian Development Agency (ZDA) enumerates pledges of investment, 
inflating the figures.231 Some sources state that investors fulfill approximately 30% of pledges 
based on Bank of Zambia and ZDA data.232 On the other hand, the ZDA states that 70% of 
pledges are completed.233 Other investments take place without the knowledge or licensing from 
ZDA, which the data cannot measure. Such businesses gain registration under a Zambian citizen, 
but are de facto Chinese, through management of the business.234 
Table 3. China’s outward FDI flows by country and region, 2004-2010 (millions of USD) 
Country 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Zambia 2.23 10.09 87.44 119.34 213.97 111.8 75.05 
Africa 317.43 391.68 519.86 1574.31 5490.55 1438.87 2111.99 
% of 
Africa 0.70% 2.58% 16.82% 7.58% 3.90% 7.77% 3.55% 
Total 5497.99 12261.17 17633.97 26506.09 55907.17 56528.99 68811.31 
% of total 0.04% 0.08% 0.50% 0.45% 0.38% 0.20% 0.11% 
SOURCE: Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment. Ministry of Commerce 
 
The above table illustrates the growth and magnitude of Chinese outward FDI flows since 
2004. Zambia represents only a small portion of total outward FDI, but when compared to total 
FDI inflows into Zambia, one discovers the influential role played by China. Table 4 below 
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presents the ten largest investors in Zambia from 2004-2007, providing a context in which to 
assess the magnitude of Chinese investment. Following that, another table presents the 
percentage of Chinese investments in Zambia over the same period of time (Table 5). 
Table 4. Ten largest investors in Zambia, 2004-2007 (USD millions) 
Rank 2004 2005 2006 2007 
1 Zimbabwe 21.2 Zambia 63.4 China 209.0 China 284.1 
2 Switzerland 17.3 India 60.5 France 104.0 Zambia 184.1 
3 Zambia 16.8 China 40.8 Zambia 91.3 S. Africa 11 
4 China 14 Kenya 25.1 Cyprus 68.7 Singapore 10 
5 Peru 6.9 Zimbabwe 20.5 G. Britain 45.7 G. Britain 9.6 
6 G. Britain 5.1 G. Britain 15.2 S. Africa  28 Australia 6.0 
7 S. Africa 3.7 S. Africa 9.6 Tanzania 27.3 Botswana 4.6 
8 Australia 3.7 Lebanon 5.5 USA 21.4 Lebanon 3.9 
9 Botswana 2.3 Canada 3 Virgin 
Islands 
14.7 New 
Zealand 
2.9 
10 Mauritius 2 Virgin 
Islands 
2.2 Denmark 14.1 India 2.6 
 
Table 5. Chinese Investment in Zambia as a share of total investment (USD millions) 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Chinese Investment 14.0 (5.85%) 40.8 (15.88%) 209.0 (30.07%) 284.1 (18.94%) 
Total investment flow 239.0 257.0 695.0 1,500.0 
Source: Chileshe (2010) 
From 2004 to 2007, the proportion of Chinese investments increased relative to other 
countries for many reasons. China facilitated investment through the establishment of the Bank 
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of China in Lusaka, Zambia in 1997.235 It provides financing for Chinese companies and its 
assets have increased to 507 billion kwacha in 2007 from 14 billion kwacha in 1997.236 Zambia 
has enabled more trade through the creation of the Zambia Development Agency (ZDA) in 2006. 
It serves as a connection between Zambia and foreign investors and is the only Zambian 
institution allowed to license FDI.237 As evidenced by table 6 below, Chinese companies invest 
widely throughout the entire economy, but account for a large share of investment in each sector. 
Table 6. China’s share of pledged FDI (US$ millions), 2007 
Sectors China Total China’s share (%) 
Manufacturing 900 1743.2 51.6 
Mining 220 441.5 49.8 
Telecommunications 150 275.1 54.5 
Total 1270 2701.5 47.0 
Source: Mwanawina (2008). 
Since Chinese investments target all sectors of the economy, they vary considerably in 
magnitude and type.238 Investments enter the Zambian market through state-owned enterprises, 
semi-private firms, private firms, and Chinese entrepreneurs. They are involved as market 
traders, medical doctors, owners of large-scale farms, and in construction and manufacturing.239 
Some of China’s substantial investments include the privately owned construction company, 
China Hainan Zambia Ltd., and Huawei, a telecommunications company that started independent 
operations in 2002. 240  The portion of China’s investment in Zambia conducted through 
companies tied to the state has access to low-cost capital, giving them a distinct advantage over 
competitors.241 Most notable are China’s state-led investments in the mining sector.242  
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Though many figures, including tables presented in this section, show large investments 
in manufacturing, many are mining-related. Such manufacturing investments include the 
Chambishi Copper Smelter Ltd., Jinchuan Group Mining Corporation Zambia, Sino Metals 
Leach Ltd., and BGrimm Explosives Ltd., investments ranging from $5.6 million to $220 
million.243 As such, the majority of China’s investment in Zambia goes to the mining sector, 
accounting for 88% of total Chinese investments.244,245 The following table (Table 7) presents 
Chinese investments categorized by sectors, and includes number of projects, proposed 
employment figures, and amount of the investment. 
 
Table 7. Chinese Investment Commitments for 1993-2007 by sector 
Sector No. of Projects Investment US$ Employment 
Agriculture 23 10,032,866 1,093 
Construction 23 41,580,151 1,773 
Engineering 1 476,000 12 
Financial 1 3,000,000 8 
Health 7 647,969 42 
Manufacturing 89 539,294,587 6,369 
Mining 5 34,918,899 550 
Services & Retail 9 16,398,000 924 
Tourism 7 19,447,300 451 
Transport 1 456,000 40 
Total 166 666,251,772 11,226 
Source: ZDA data, Muneku (2009). 
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As previously stated, Chinese involvement in the mining sector started with CNMC’s 
acquisition of Chambishi mines in 1998, 246  marking China’s first overseas mine. 247  At 
privatization, after being inactive for 13 years,248 Chambishi mines employed 143 workers.249 
Under Chinese ownership employment expanded to 2,000 Zambians and 168 Chinese, 
representative of many Chinese investments in Zambia’s mining sector.250 Though still centered 
on Chambishi mines, Chinese companies have expanded to Baluba, Chibuluma and Kabwe.251 
China has invested over $35 million in companies like Tian Heng Mining and Minerals Ltd.252 
Zambia’s copper industry also hosts smaller investments by an unknown number private Chinese 
companies, which do not provide information on the scale of operations.253 
Initially, China relied on South African companies to process the copper concentrate, or 
exported it to Namibia.254 Through increased investment, China has come to control the all steps 
of copper processing. As of 2009, Chinese-owned copper mines accounted for 5.32% of the 
annual capacity of copper ore and concentrate, and 10.94% of annual capacity of copper metal 
production.255 It should be noted that while China has become an influential investor, NFC-
Africa (a CNMC subsidiary) remains a minor player in the copper industry.256 
The establishment of the Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in the Chambishi zone illustrates 
the importance of mining to China-Zambia relations. The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation 
(FOCAC) in 2006 set up a China-Africa Development Fund to establish preferential trade and 
investment zones throughout Africa. 257 Chinese President Hu Jintao inaugurated the zone in 
February 2007, demonstrating Chinese commitment to the undertaking. 258  It was the first 
Chinese SEZ established in Africa 259  and is currently the only operating Chinese SEZ in 
Africa.260 In January 2009, the creation of a sub-zone in Lusaka for light manufacturing further 
expanded and diversified Chinese investment in Zambia. 261  Its location near the Lusaka 
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international airport facilitates additional imports, since raw material, capital goods and 
machinery are duty-free.262 
CNMC has established 13 subsidiaries in the zone, related to mining and the processing 
of minerals.263 The zone hopes to draw in investment of $800 million USD,264 attracting forty 
Chinese companies and ten from other countries through graduated tax incentives.265 The SEZ is 
managed by a Chinese development company, which decides what investments to allow.266 As 
of 2009, eleven active companies occupied the zone, with another five preparing to start 
operations.267 As intended the zone has brought other forms of investment, such as Chinese 
investment in infrastructure.268 In return, much of Africa enjoys China’s Generalized System of 
Preferential Status for their exports.269  
Table 8. Overview of China’s official African trade and economic cooperation zones. 
Country Size Planning 
initiated 
Status as of late 
2010 
Developers Industry focus 
Zambia 
Chambishi and 
Lusaka subzone 
11.58 km2 
(7.98 km2) 
startup 2km2 
Lusaka: 5km2 
2003 In operation & 
under construction 
Lusaka: planning 
China 
Nonferrous 
Mining Group 
(CNMC) 
Copper and cobalt 
processing 
Lusaka: garments, 
good, appliances, 
tobacco, electronics 
Source: Brautigam & Xiaoyang (2011). 
 
Impacts of Investment 
 Ill effects as well as benefits have accompanied Chinese investment, similar to large 
amounts of FDI entering any developing country. Chinese traders have increased Zambian 
purchasing power by providing cheaper alternatives.270 Studies have shown that Lusaka and the 
Copperbelt regions have experienced the largest reductions in poverty in recent years.271,272 
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These same goods, however, have crowded out Zambian goods at market and other local 
enterprises.273 Beyond the personal impacts of Chinese investment in Zambia, it has brought 
improved infrastructure and an alternative to Western aid.274 
In the mining sector, in particular, Chinese investment has promoted economic growth. It 
has improved well-being by expanding employment in the mining sector, as previously 
mentioned. A report by Britain’s Department for International Development (DfID) found that 
Chinese companies employ relatively more local workers, opposed to importing them from 
China. 275 Though employment has increased the recent rise in copper prices rarely benefit 
Zambian citizens.276  
As with other extractive industries, any increase in production leads to an increase in 
environmental degradation, unless mitigated. Two Chinese-owned mines have closed due to 
unmet safety and environmental standards.277 While this showcases the adverse environmental 
impacts of increased Chinese investment, the environmental degradation due to mining – 
presented in the section on Zambia’s environmental problems – are not solely caused by Chinese 
companies. 278 Rather it can be attributed to the structure of development agreements during 
privatization, which allowed companies to bypass environmental regulations.279 
As Chinese investment continues to increase, the community of Chinese companies and 
emigrants also grows, creating both formal and informal networks to promote continued 
investment.280 The network system that exists in Zambia is particularly supportive. In a survey of 
Chinese investors, they identified ‘government support’ as the second most important reason for 
choosing to invest in Zambia.281 Economic and Commercial Counselors (ECC), located within 
the Chinese embassies, help identify investment opportunities282 and connect Chinese investors 
with each other.283 In addition to the ZDA, Zambia’s own center for investment information, 
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Chinese investors can join the Association for Chinese Companies in Zambia (ACCZ). 
Established by the Chinese Ministry of Commerce in 2006, it is equivalent to a chamber of 
commerce. 284  Prior to the ACCZ, the Chinese Center for Investment Promotion and Trade 
(CCIPT) was established by political decree to identify investment projects and support new 
companies.285 The growing Chinese population in Zambia remains unconnected to the Zambian 
population, causing political and economic tension.286 
Interaction with regulations  
Governance of FDI in Zambia has neglected Zambian firms and citizens, since they have 
not ensured that they gain the benefits of investment. Much of the regulations and management 
practices in place resulted from pressure by Western donors. 287 Instead the government has 
guaranteed that Zambia remains an attractive center of investment. Though the creation of the 
ZDA placed stricter requirements on investors regarding minimum investment and employment 
creation, it still favored the investor. 288 Under the ZDA, investors do not have to use local 
content, use subcontractors, or transfer technology. They can repatriate any capital investments; 
send home profit, interest, dividends, and wages earned by foreign nationals.289 Several scholars 
account for poor enforcement of regulations by the lack of environmental regulations and 
corporate social responsibility within Chinese companies, as well as the lack of free press and a 
strong system of NGOs in recipient countries, like Zambia.290 Due to the central role of the 
government in China’s economy, Zambia’s government bears the responsibility of regulating 
FDI. 
In many developing countries, the parent company bears the responsibility of meeting 
regulations and must self-report. For China’s many SOEs, the responsibility lies with the 
Department of Foreign Economic Cooperation, under the Ministry of Commerce. 291 Though 
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sanctioning mechanisms exist, it is difficult to regulate actions from afar. The corporate 
governance structure of Chinese investors makes it difficult to strengthen Zambian regulation 
given the weak regulatory environment, which further endangers sustainable development.292 
The centralization of Chinese actors does not ease regulation and enforcement. Since Chinese 
investments include many different actors there is no consensus about its involvement in Africa, 
but rather a continuing debate.293  
 
Zambian environmental regulation 
  Zambia has a legacy of formally including the environment in its political life and 
legislation. The Constitution of Zambia includes mention of environmental preservation and the 
management of natural resources.294 Not until 1990, did Zambia create overarching legislation to 
oversee environmental management: the Environmental Protection and Pollution Control Act 
(EPPCA).295 In 1992, the Environmental Council of Zambia (ECZ) was created.296  
The ECZ implements environmental policies under the Ministry of Tourism, 
Environment, and Natural Resources (MTENR), which develops environmental policy and 
legislation. 297298 The ECZ relies on 11 different ministries for certain functions, since Zambia’s 
environmental law spreads over 33 sets of legislation. 299  Separation by sector requires a 
substantial amount of coordination, making regulation more difficult. 300 Capacity constraints 
limit the effectiveness of ECZ’s enforcement of regulations. 
Environmental legislation and regulations were created with international support, from 
several international NGOs, multilateral lending agencies, and bilateral development 
organizations. 301 With the help of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), 
Zambia formed the regulations for conducting environmental impact assessments in 1997.302 
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Though international support offers technical assistance, it has led to further confusion among 
Zambian’s environmental legislation, which includes the 21 international treaty agreements.303 
 The mining sector comes under the purview of the ECZ and the Ministry of Mines and 
Minerals Development (MMMD).304 A potential investor must prepare a project brief for the 
Director of Mines Safety stating the activities and environmental impact.305 If satisfied with the 
information, the Director forwards the brief to ECZ with his recommendation, and an 
environmental impact statement is prepared. 306  On the basis of the environment impact 
statement, ECZ decides whether to require an environmental impact assessment (EIA).307 The 
ability to grant mining licenses and prospecting rights to potential investors lies with the Minister 
of Mines for large mining projects, and the Director of Mines for small-scale mining.308 The 
Director of Mines Safety oversees the safe working environments of the mines.309  
Throughout the process, investors can apply for exemptions with the appropriate 
ministry. In order to limit the number of exemptions requested, a company that applies must 
contribute to an Environmental Protection Fund, used to address environmental degradation 
caused by mining.310 The regulatory context in Zambia suffers from political interference,311 and 
the sheer magnitude of Chinese investments combined with the historical relationship between 
the two countries, makes China politically influential. In theory, the ECZ and Mines Safety 
Department monitors an environmental management plan for pollution control and safety issues, 
respectively.312 Since 1997, seventeen project briefs have been submitted in the mining sector, 
seven of which resulted in EIAs.313 Many of these have taken place in more developed areas 
where the technical capacity exists.314  
The presence of Zambia’s established regulations for investment, labor and the 
environment, does not ensure adequate enforcement. 315  Environmental law is overlapping, 
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confusing, and disjointed, making it largely unenforceable.316 Legislation lacks a mechanism for 
public participation – the district council or local chief seldom contribute feedback prior to the 
granting of mining licenses or prospecting rights – and a plan for mine decommissioning. 317 
Lack of regulation did not begin with Chinese investment, but engulfs the entire mining. 
Environmental policies were not enforced during the period of ZCCM, resulting in air and water 
pollution of local communities.318 In 2006, Konkola Copper Mines, owned by ZCCM-IH and a 
private Indian company, 319 released effluents in the Kafue River and was never held 
accountable.320 Zambia’s two most recent development plans (2006-2010; 2011-2015) aim to 
improve management of natural resources, by evaluating current regulations and making 
necessary changes. 321 , 322  However, the plans maintain the sectoral separation, and cannot 
enhance capacity without appropriate funding.  
 
Conclusion 
As a developing country, Zambia must continually balance the use and preservation of its 
natural resources with its need for economic growth and development. Commonly the argument 
heard is that it is difficult to save the environment, when people are dying from poverty. 
However many of gains from recent economic growth generated by the mining sector has not 
benefited regular Zambians. The government first has to be accountable to the people in order to 
effectively balance the advantages of FDI and proper management of its environment. Zambia 
represents other African countries, and as such provides an illustrative case study of Chinese 
investment in the continent. 
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Policy Recommendations  
 
Introduction 
 
 China’s environmental focus in recent years indicates significant improvements in 
sustainable growth, and the potential for progress remains, particularly with outward foreign 
direct investment.  In this report, our focus is on the policy side of environmental affairs.  We 
surveyed the existing regulations—or lack thereof—for domestic and foreign environmental 
investments.  We find that China is increasingly placing recommendations or standards for 
environmental sustainability within the country.  However, abroad, no outward foreign direct 
regulations exist.  Instead, host countries are expected to place regulations on investors, and 
China’s government requires host-country regulation compliance.   Chinese businesses abroad 
play a role as well; they have the option of adopting voluntary international standards related to 
the environment.   Using the theory behind the pollution haven hypothesis, we explain the 
challenge faced by host countries wishing to attract investment in an environmentally-friendly 
way.  We also use a study on developed country regulations as a benchmark to determine policy 
ideas or examples for improving environmental growth.  Drawing on the lessons from China and 
our four country regions in the country report, we develop recommendations to incentivize—and 
improve upon—environmentally-friendly growth and investments.  We provide recommendations 
under three broad categories:  targeting local institutions, targeting regulatory bodies, and targeting 
investors.    
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Part I:  Environmental Regulation and FDI Debate 
Pollution Haven Hypothesis  
 Globalization makes pollution and environmental concerns an international problem.  
The “Pollution Haven Hypothesis” (PHH) posits that pollution-intensive multinational firms 
relocate to developing countries where there are few environmental standards.  Yet, when 
looking at the effects of FDI, one must consider a variety of influential factors that may have a 
greater influence on the distribution of FDI than environmental regulations (ER); the host 
country’s infrastructure, strength of institutions, and rates of corruption.  When taking into 
account other intervening variables, statistical analysis has not shown convincing evidence of the 
PHH being true.   A detailed review of existing studies looking into the PHH shows that there is 
little evidence that the US and other OCED members demonstrate PHH habits.  On the contrary, 
studies show that US ER do not encourage MNCs to “go permit shopping” in less developed 
regions.  
Research shows that inter-state differences in environmental regulations do not influence 
the geographical locations of US plants or distribution of FDI. 323  Studies that show evidence of 
PHH are usually criticized for small sample sizes and weak robustness. 324  After analyzing trade 
and investment data, it is clear that US FDI in pollution intensive industries has not increased in 
developing countries compared to developed countries.  When studies introduce other control 
variables, environmental regulations have a negative and significant effect on the probability of 
firm location.  This suggests that countries avoid having to “clean up” later so they resist 
investing in countries with low environmental standards.325  MNCs are generally more 
productive than domestic firms and the MNCs adopt the clean technology of their home 
countries.  The technology transfer from the home plants to the multinational plants is easy and 
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cost effective and almost always is implemented even if the host country does not require those 
certain standards.326 
Pollution Haven Hypothesis and the CAAA 
 A recent study by Rema Hanna analyzed the effect of the CAAA legislation and 
determined it did increase the outbound FDI of US-based MNCs in dirty industries, but it did not 
disproportionally increase production in developing nations relative to developed countries.327   
Interestingly, Hanna finds “firm specific factors are an important determinant of FDI, and 
therefore, estimates of the regulation effect using cross-sectional data, where it is difficult to 
control for unobserved factors across firm by industry groups, may overstate the effect of 
environmental regulation on FDI.”328 Economic theory does not necessarily predict that firms 
will disproportionately increase investment to developing nations.  Environmental regulations in 
the US do not alter conditions such as interest rations and costs of production across foreign 
nations.  Therefore, it is not likely that a firm would automatically expect a change in the 
distribution of a firm’s foreign portfolio.329 Firms are not investing in more countries in response 
to the CAAA; firms merely increase the activity at existing plants and choose not to enter 
developing markets.330  Ultimately, Hanna argues that foreign substation effects are small 
relative to total existing MNC production in the US.331 
 
Part II:  Case Study Comparisons of OFDI Environmental Legislation and Challenges 
United States OFDI Regulations 
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is the first trade agreement to 
openly incorporate environmental provisions.  NAFTA expanded environmental provisions in 
the US Clean Air Act (USCAA) passed in 1967, to Mexico and Canada. The USCAA is a US 
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federal law enforced to control air pollution nation-wide.  In 1970, amendments to the USCAAA 
required federal and state regulations for industrial pollution and mobile sources of pollution 
such as cars.  Amendments in 1990 introduced the “Responsible Corporate Officer” doctrine, 
which was a way for the US government to federally enforce criminal liability for environmental 
damage by corporations.332  This was a major move towards strict liability of environmental 
crimes of US corporations.   
 The USCAA established separate national air standards for different locales with a 
minimum level of quality that all US counties are required by law to meet.  Each year, counties 
whose air qualities are more polluted than federal standards require are labeled nonattainment 
counties; those that do are labeled attainment counties.333  According to those two designations, 
manufacturing plants that emit one of the four criteria pollutants in a nonattainment county are 
held to more stringent environmental regulations than those manufacturing plants in attainment 
counties.  When a county is designated as nonattainment, the CAAA requires that state to 
develop a State Implementation Plan (SIP) which outlines specific regulations for the source of 
each pollutant that is in nonattainment in the country.  The SIPs require that new investments or 
plant renovations in nonattainment counties incorporate the installation of state-of-the-art 
pollution abatement equipment.  Existing plants must install reasonably available control 
technologies.334  On the contrary, large-scale investments in attainment counties do not require 
the shift to more expensive equipment and the plants are left almost unregulated.335  The CAAA 
has proven effective and enforceable as air pollution concentrations have declined at a faster rate 
in nonattainment counties after the enforcement of regulations than in attainment counties.336   
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Other High Income Country Regulation Policies   
 Canada and Europe have also adopted similar environmental regulations for in-country 
production.  Both Canada and the United Kingdom impose criminal liability for corporate 
officers in charge of environmental regulation.  In addition, the European Union has adopted 
widespread environmental regulations.  In 1957, six European countries signed the Treaty of 
Rome and established the European Economic Community (EC).337  In the 1970s, the 
Environmental Action Plans (EAPs) were passed, but there was no active enforcement of these 
acts until 1986.  In 1986 the Single European Act was passed, which included several structural 
changes:  majority voting, harmonization of laws, and guidelines to govern environmental 
policy, but it was not until the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 that the policy-making process of the 
EU was revolutionized. 
Challenges in Global Environmental Regulation  
 The international community has yet to successfully implement global environmental 
standards; each country is responsible for enforcing their individual regulations. Ultimately, 
regulations and environmental protection must be the passion and responsibility of the 
corporation for the mindset of the organization to shift to environmental protection.   
 The first obstacle to international environmental regulations is the failure to negotiate the 
implementation of international environmental standards.  Negotiations of the Multilateral 
Agreement on Investment (MAI) in 1998 left countries without any international mechanism to 
regulate FDI, the negotiations concluded that regulating FDI on a global scale would give 
governments too much power.  The Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS), the widest 
accepted trade agreement, is limited in scope and is an agreement among states.  It does not 
directly affect investors nor deal specifically with environmental regulations.   
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 Another major obstacle to environmental regulation is the concept of investor protection 
and expropriation.  Some countries are wary of introducing more restrictive environmental 
regulations or a regime to enforce them out of fear of being financial liable from an investor 
challenging the regulations.  The concept of expropriation has grown; now government efforts to 
enforce their environmental regulations are subject to arbitration since companies can declare the 
regulations “tantamount to expropriation.”338  If the investor’s properties were taken or their 
profits were impeded due to the introduction of an environmental regulation, the government 
may be forced to compensate for the company’s lost money.   
 Ultimately, to protect the environment, the individual corporations must internalize the 
desire to establish and enforce environmental regulations.  There are no adequate international 
corporate environmental regimes or international environmental laws to constrain corporate 
activities.  Corporate governance regimes must make environmental impact a primary concern 
and the director must be responsible to ensure compliance.  Environmental protection cannot be 
another external regulation; environmental protection must be the heartbeat of the boardroom for 
a corporation.339   
 
Part III:  NGO Literature Review 
 Governments have the tendency not only to be poor providers of governance, but they 
also may be or become instruments of repression, environmental degradation, and bureaucratic 
paralysis."340 NGOs can play the role of leading social and political change to improve the 
acceptance of the role of NGOs within the governing process.  
 Opinion differs on the impact that NGOs have on environmental protection. In 
accordance with the positive group, environmental NGOs play “five key roles”341 in the global 
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environmental governance system. The first one is information-based duties. NGOs play a 
critical role in the collection of information, dissemination and analysis.342 Secondly, input into 
policy development. Environmental NGOs have successfully participated in the process of 
negotiating and implementing Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) and have 
pursued good relationships with states to influence their environmental policy-making. The third 
role is operational functions. As the organizational structure of NGOs are more informal and 
less bureaucratic and hierarchical, compared with governments, they can “make the impossible 
possible by doing what governments cannot or will not do”343 The fourth is assessment and 
monitoring: “NGOs are . . . capable of making sensitive or politically important information 
public – something that intergovernmental organizations often are reluctant or loathe to do 
because of their dependence on member states for resources”.344 The last one is advocacy for 
environmental justice; despite some negative opinion, NGOs have been successful in bring 
attention toward environmental protection.   
 NGOs have used international conferences to directly help shape international laws and 
institutions, even though the conferences have brought little consensus between countries. In 
some cases, NGOs have been successful in collaborating with underdeveloped countries to 
promote conserving policies against developed countries and have successfully lobbied multi-
lateral banks to include environmental costs within their project calculations.   NGOs must 
provide vision to teach society how to learn its way out of  the environmental crisis. To perform 
this role, NGOs must be established as independent actors with legal, financial, and political 
support.  They also must avoid the fate of governments and corporations that focus on short-term 
decisions, the mandate to constantly grow, and the tendency to creatively externalize costs. 
Within this challenging task, NGOs must  build up bargaining assets while bringing 
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consciousness from local levels to global leaders. Again, NGOs must retain the ability to tell 
hard truths without the fear of losing customers or constituents.  
 
Part IV:  Recommendations 
 
Environmental protection can be improved in South America, Mongolia, Myanmar, and 
Zambia through a variety of mechanisms. As evidenced by the country reports, multiple actors 
regulate and monitor the environmental performance of foreign investments in extractive 
industries. As such, TNC and the involved governments can promote environmentally 
sustainable practices by partnering with local communities and NGOs, regulatory bodies, and 
investors. Each partnership entails different activities, ranging from training to incentives. The 
following recommendations are presented by partner and accompanied by country specific 
examples to account for particular characteristics of each region and their investment 
environment. Though many recommendations can be implemented by TNC, several 
recommendations also apply to government actors and local NGOs in each country. 
 
Recommendations for Local Communities and NGOs 
 In China and in host countries, local communities and institutions play a powerful role in 
information awareness, education, and capacity building.  When environmental regulations are 
lacking, a demand gap is often found at the local level.  As a result, we recommend improving 
institutions and promoting services to promote environmental sustainability.  Both the 
government and local NGOs can play a role in this area.  TNC particularly can play a role in the 
provision of awareness and education.   
 One problem with environmental regulations is that institutional support for the 
environment exists only at a small scale on the national level, and few organizations exist at the 
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local level.345  The lack of environmentally-focused institutions makes monitoring and 
enforcement more difficult.   The government could use local institutions to build trustworthy 
relationships, increase education and awareness about environmental issues, and improve 
monitoring.  The local institutions can also serve as information sources for the national level 
institutions, providing support for macro environmental strategy development.  Local institution 
building would be useful in all four country regions.   
 Awareness is a powerful tool to stimulate demand for environmental protection.  By 
providing information to individuals, businesses, and governments, people can make well-
informed judgments to improve investments.  The Mongolia case provides an example of how to 
improve awareness.  In Mongolia, programs could be provided to raise society’s awareness of 
mining environmental impacts, environment protection laws, and mining monitoring process. 
Such programs could include TV shows, social media, local forums, and workshops. Also, given 
TNC’s current cooperation with the Mongolian government, organizing joint meetings between 
local communities and local governments will help create direct dialogue channels between the 
parties and popular demand will be created for environmental sustainability. 
 Education is another critical area for providing interest—and stimulating demand—in the 
environmental sector.  Countries and companies alike would benefit from education targeted at two 
areas:   training and monitoring.  Zambia has critical areas where education can assist in promoting 
sustainability. As previously explored, Zambia has the existing legislation and regulations needed to 
protect the environment. However, the country lacks the human capital to adequately enforce such 
regulations. TNC can promote environmental protection by partnering with the government and 
appropriate ministries in Zambia to provide locals with training in environmental monitoring, 
specifically environmental impact assessments. Zambians could then monitor the environmental 
performance and impacts of mining companies. Currently, the TNC office in Zambia is working with 
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Zambians in the Kafue ecosystem, helping them implement conservation practices. The proposed 
effort would be similar, but would also require technical training.  
 Capacity building provides an important venue for supporting environmentally-friendly 
activities.  In Mongolia, capacity building would greatly improve efforts targeted at sustainability.  
For example, Mongolia could form a working group that is responsible for conducting an 
evaluation report on the local governments’ enforcement of environmental laws. The report 
should be based upon fieldwork that gathers accurate data to analyze legal practices of 
companies and local governments’ responses to these practices. The report should be made 
public to hold accountable any corrupted officials and companies.    
 Monitoring and accountability at the local level are critical to ensure regulation 
compliance.  NGOs play a powerful role in this area because they can act as an independent 
party for evaluating the fulfillment of environmental protection laws.  NGOs can also improve 
accountability between local governments and companies.  At times, coordination between 
information-based, advocacy-based, and legal-based NGOs may be useful to ensure 
comprehensive advocacy.     
 
Recommendations for Regulatory Bodies 
 TNC and other NGOs can actively assist regulatory bodies by providing recommendations 
for enhanced regulations to governments.  The presence of TNC and other environmentally-focused 
NGOs can provide developing areas such as South America, Mongolia, Myanmar, and Zambia with 
needed expertise to maintain and manage each region’s environmental wealth. To benefit from such 
resources, these organizations must have working relationships with the government and relevant 
ministries. 
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 Building strong connections with regulatory bodies is extraordinarily valuable.  In the case of 
Myanmar, addressing Myanmar’s half-hearted environmental governance and worsening 
environmental problems would be useful.  TNC could establish and build strong relationships with 
the leadership of the National Commission on Environmental Affairs (NCEA) and Forest 
Department, which comprise Myanmar’s regulatory institutions for environmental affairs. Though 
this strategy will require much patience and time to bear fruit, initiating and maintaining these strong 
relationships is highly important because personalized “policy” trumps laws in Myanmar. Personal 
relationships override the efficacy of institutional relationships, the institutions themselves and the 
continuity of implementing institutional policies.346  Developing these relationships with the NCEA 
and Forest Department will enable the leadership of these regulatory bodies to gradually adopt 
environmental preservation into the formula for regime legitimacy, a constant concern for the 
government’s ex-military rulers. Strong relationships with the Forest Department have allowed 
environmental NGOs like the Smithsonian Institution and Wildlife Conservation Society to 
successfully achieve their environmental goals of wildlife sanctuary staff training and assessment of 
protected areas.347 However, TNC should prepare for setbacks in building relationships with the 
NCEA and Forest Department because their leadership can be swapped overnight by decree from 
Myanmar’s senior leaders. These senior leaders change the regulatory bodies’ leadership 
unpredictably and arbitrarily because their top position gives them the moral authority to intervene at 
any level of government out of personal whim to achieve their own national ends.348 
 At the local level, monitoring is critical.  For proper regulation to occur, government officials 
must be trained in assessment and monitoring.  One strategy that TNC can employ to tackle 
Myanmar’s environmental challenges is provide training to NCEA and Forest Department staff 
members in public environmental education, environmental empirical assessment methods and 
sanctuary management. Raising the ability of these two regulatory institutions to preserve 
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Myanmar’s environment and promote environmental awareness among the public instead of 
delegating these tasks to TNC addresses the problems facing environmental governance in the 
country. Most importantly, this training of local environmental protection staff helps the regime show 
its citizenry that it, rather than foreigners, can competently manage Myanmar’s environmental issues, 
which can boost its governing legitimacy.349 Despite these possible positive outcomes of training 
NCEA and Forest Department staff in proper environmental management, TNC should be aware that 
both regulatory bodies’ low status in the Myanmar government gives their staff the incentive to 
manipulate their data and falsify their reports to the senior leadership. What drives this incentive is 
the Burmese cultural concept of a-na-de, which is reluctance to embarrass the senior leadership or 
superiors with negative news so that their authority and power is enhanced.350 A-na-de has been 
intensified by Myanmar’s military hierarchy and compromises potential progress in environmental 
governance from training of local staff in this field. 
 To provide proper monitoring and accountability, information provision is essential. Accurate 
data collection needs to identify and improve upon problem areas related to environmental 
development and regulations.  However, information transparency remains a significant barrier to 
measuring progress.  A substantial improvement in the realm of sustainable growth would be to 
increase monitoring of firms.  The Chinese government could incorporate a government-
sponsored division to track firms operating abroad.  However, because compliance is based on 
the host country laws and not on China’s laws, it may be more feasible to place monitoring and 
enforcement power in the hands of the host country.  If China chose to play a greater role in 
ensuring environmentally sustainable outward foreign direct investment, it faces a number of 
options. 
 In the case of Mongolia,   TNC and other NGOs could form surveillance teams that are 
responsible for monitoring Artisanal Mining Sector. Regular reports should be presented to local 
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governments to help them develop mechanisms to control this growing sector based on accurate 
data. These reports should also be made public to create popular support for regulating the 
AMS.   
 
Recommendations for Investors 
 To ensure that investors are investing in sustainable ways, the government and NGOs may 
need to intervene, either directly through regulations, or indirectly through advocacy and information 
provision.  Specifically, incentives and training should be used to ensure that investors pursue a path 
that has long-term environmental objectives. 
 Incentives play a critical role in shaping demand and influencing behavior.  Incentives 
include components such as government taxation, subsidies, targets, and green bank credit loans.  In 
general, trade tools and regulations can affect firm behavior.  To improve environmental 
regulation compliance, China could establish a tax that targets the use or import of 
environmentally-sensitive goods.  Alternatively, China could offer credits for sustainable 
production or other rewards for pursuing responsible investment behavior abroad.   China could 
also decide to establish eco-friendly trade policies.  However, even the United States does not 
regulate environmental outward foreign direct investment.  In these cases, environmental 
regulation may have to occur domestically with the goal that sustainable expansion behavior will 
translate into firm investments abroad.    Another option is to promote more inter-agency 
collaboration.  In 2007, the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP), the China Banking 
Regulatory Commission (CBRC), and the People’s bank of China (PBOC) implemented a Green 
Credit Policy, which promotes lending only for green business initiatives.351  In this 
circumstance, China can indirectly regulate environmental regulation compliance through access 
to finance.  A recent collaborative proposal is the creation of an “Environmental Policy 
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Package,” which would incorporate mechanisms to improve management and supervision of 
environmental issues.352   
 In South America, incentives could be improved through loans and finance provision.  A 
critical institution for ensuring environmental compliance is the banking sector.  China’s Export-
Import Bank (Ex-Im Bank) uses finance to stimulate environmental protection.  By lending only, 
to businesses that show a certain degree of environmental compliance, the bank is restricting the 
number of firms that can invest abroad.  These objectives are applied for Chinese firms that 
apply for funding to invest abroad.  Banks in South America could adopt similar provisions. 
 In terms of training, a number of strategies are available.  To improve its environmental 
objectives, China has initiated cooperation with a number of organizations.  A major player in 
China is the World Wildlife Fund (WWF).  To encourage sustainability, the WWF coordinated 
with China to create the China for a Global Shift Initiative.353  As noted in the goals of the 12th 
Five-Year Plan, China hopes to develop a green indicator.  In 2011, the China Centre for 
International Economy Exchange (CCIEE) and the WWF “signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding that aims, among other issues, to develop a Green Economy Indicator for 
China.”354  The indicator, which should help shape environmentally-friendly policies, will 
include components such as the Ecological Footprint.355  By incorporating the expertise of 
environmental organizations into its policy making, China will better position itself to achieve its 
sustainable development goals.   
 Training courses on CSR and environmental awareness from international institutions 
and NGOs such as the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and the WWF are becoming 
increasingly popular.356  Rearchers from the Center for International Forestry Research noted 
that the Chinese government will likely play a stronger role in sustainable OFDI in the future:  
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“We can expect that more policies concerning the social and environmental impacts of Chinese 
OFDI will be issued, supplementing China’s existing OFDI management system.”357 
 Zambia illustrates the need for greater training and enforcement.  Currently Zambia lacks 
adequate enforcement of environmental regulations, which places the responsibility on investing 
companies to self-report. TNC Beijing can work with Chinese SOEs involved in Zambia to promote 
environmentally sustainable practices in current investments. Promotion of such practices includes 
training on monitoring and reporting environmental performance. Prior to receiving practical 
training, TNC can work to encourage awareness of the negative consequences of environmental 
degradation and the benefits of environmentally practices. 
 Myanmar also needs change.  To address resource extraction pollution, Myanmar could work 
with Chinese SOEs on environmentally sustainable practices.  With the Myanmar authorities 
reluctant to assist TNC in tackling resource extraction pollution due to their mistrust of foreign 
NGOs and fears that the pollution could harm their legitimacy, TNC should team up with China’s 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to mitigate the pollution. This approach will involve training SOE 
executives and project managers on environmental sustainable practices such as pollution monitoring 
and cleanup and introducing SOE staff to environmentally sound resource extraction technologies. 
The success of this strategy depends on the SOE’s willingness to adopt these practices and 
technologies.  
 If the SOE wants to build up its international image as a responsible investor to gain access to 
resources in developed countries, then its executives and managers need to work with TNC to 
“green” its extraction activities. The SOE has ample resource profits to invest in environmentally 
sound practices and green extraction technologies. However, the SOE has reasons to turn down 
cooperation with TNC on minimizing environmental degradation from resource extraction. First, 
China’s soaring demand for energy and natural resources puts pressure on the SOE to lower its 
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contract bidding price to increase access to resource deposits; adopting green measures and 
technologies will raise that price. Second, the security provided by Myanmar’s military forces or 
tatmadaw to Chinese SOEs from local ethnic groups that oppose their extraction projects incentivizes 
the SOEs to shirk responsibility over the environmental damage generated from their projects. Third, 
extracting resources in Myanmar outside of Chinese jurisdiction and far from Beijing encourages 
SOE project managers to keep their executive superiors and China’s central government in the dark 
about the environmental fallout from their extraction. To address this possible resistance by SOEs to 
“greening” their practices, TNC should prepare to persuade these SOEs on the benefits of such 
“greening” and work with SOE heads to improve environmental reporting mechanisms between 
project managers and executives. 
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